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On the Internet, obscure information has a minimal risk of being
discovered or understood by unintended recipients. Empirical
research demonstrates that Internet users rely on obscurity perhaps
more than anything else to protect their privacy. Yet, online obscurity
has been largely ignored by courts and lawmakers. In this Article, we
argue that obscurity is a critical component of online privacy, but it
has not been embraced by courts and lawmakers because it has never
been adequately defined or conceptualized. This lack of definition has
resulted in the concept of online obscurity being too insubstantial to
serve as a helpful guide in privacy disputes. In its place, courts and
lawmakers have generally found that the unfettered ability of any
hypothetical individual to find and access information on the Internet
renders that information public, and therefore ineligible for privacy
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protection. Drawing from multiple disciplines, this Article develops a
more focused, clear, and workable definition of online obscurity:
information is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that
are essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four
of these factors: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3)
identification, and (4) clarity. This framework could be applied as an
analytical tool or as part of an obligation. Viewing obscurity as a
continuum could help courts and lawmakers determine if information
is eligible for privacy protections. Obscurity could also serve as a
compromise protective remedy: instead of forcing websites to remove
sensitive information, courts could mandate some form of obscurity.
Finally, obscurity could form part of an agreement where Internet
users bound to a “duty to maintain obscurity” would be allowed to
further disclose information so long as they kept the information
generally as obscure as they received it.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet users routinely hide information by making it invisible to search
engines, using pseudonyms and multiple profiles, and taking advantage of
privacy settings. Individuals rely almost reflexively on the obscurity created by
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these techniques to protect their privacy in daily life.1 Yet, incredibly, the
concept of obscurity has languished in legal privacy doctrine. Courts have
attempted to refine other complex privacy concepts such as “publicity,”2
“newsworthiness,”3 and the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”4 However,
“obscurity” has yet to have a clear legal conceptualization or role. The
neglected and distorted state of obscurity in privacy doctrine is a significant
problem because the concept of obscurity is too central to the expectations of
Internet users for courts and lawmakers to ignore.
This Article has three main purposes: (1) to demonstrate that obscurity is a
crucial component of online privacy that has largely been ignored by the law,
(2) to conceptualize online obscurity in a useful way for privacy doctrine, and
(3) to propose ways that our conceptualization could be implemented to remedy
the tension between privacy law and Internet users’ experience and
expectations. By better defining online obscurity, this Article aims to provide a
framework that is more effective than the current approach to answering some
of the difficult legal questions regarding online privacy.
The importance of obscurity has dramatically increased since the advent
of the social web. The original one-way broadcast nature of the web has given
way to a virtually endless patchwork of private conversations, back alleys,
hidden forums, and walled gardens. It has been estimated that 80–99 percent of
the World Wide Web is completely hidden from general-purpose search
engines and only accessible by those with the right search terms, URL,5 or
insider knowledge.6 Other pieces of online information are obfuscated by the
1. See, e.g., danah boyd, Why Youth ♥ Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 133 (David Buckingham ed.,
2008), available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/dmal.9780262524834.119
(“Most people believe that security through obscurity will serve as a functional barrier online. For the
most part, this is a reasonable assumption.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s
Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 835 (2010) (“People also have
a sense that their social-network information will be kept private because they feel anonymous amidst
the millions of social-network users.”); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged”
Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2009); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1160–63 (2009). This assertion is addressed in greater detail in Part II.
2. See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Beaumont v. Brown,
257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977); Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1962); Brents v. Morgan, 299
S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
3. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F.
Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
4. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. See Memorandum from Berners-Lee et al., Network Working Group Members of the
Internet Engineering Task Force, to the Public for Comments on RFC 1738: Uniform Resource
Locators (URL) (Dec. 1994), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt. A URL, or Uniform
Resource Locator, describes “syntax and semantics of formalized information for location and access
of resources via the Internet.” Id. For example, the web address http://yahoo.com is a URL that
resolves to the Yahoo website.
6. See, e.g., Michael K. Bergman, The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value, 7 J. ELECTRIC
PUBLISHING, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jep;view=text;rgn=main;idno=3336451.
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use of pseudonyms, multiple profiles, and privacy settings.7 Is this functionally
obscure information any different in practice than information protected by a
password? The law is inconsistent in its answer, and this is a problem.8
Because courts and lawmakers have failed to develop online obscurity as
a concept, the law in a number of online privacy disputes remains difficult to
square with the expectations of Internet users. For example, if a blogger limits
access to her website to those who have a password, are her posts considered
public or private? How should courts classify pseudonymous postings that are
invisible to search engines but accessible by anyone in possession of the URL?
If a website introduces searchable facial recognition technology, has it broken
any promises of privacy to users who previously uploaded photos and may
have relied on the fact those photos were not previously searchable?
Drawing upon empirical research from multiple disciplines, this Article
develops a focused, clear, and workable definition of online obscurity:
information is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these
factors: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4)
clarity.
This framework could be applied to online privacy disputes in various
ways. Courts could use an obscurity continuum when determining if certain
information is eligible for privacy protections. Obscurity also could be used as
a protective remedy—instead of forcing websites to remove information, courts
and lawmakers could, in appropriate contexts, mandate a form of obscurity.
Finally, obscurity could replace confidentiality as a term in some contracts.
Internet users bound by a “duty to maintain obscurity” would be allowed to
further disclose information online, so long as they kept the information
generally as obscure as they received it.

0007.104 (2001) (“Since they are missing the deep Web when they use such search engines, Internet
searchers are therefore searching only 0.03%—or one in 3,000—of the pages available to them
today.”); Norm Medeiros, Reap What You Sow: Harvesting the Deep Web, 18 OCLC SYS. & SERVS.
18 (2002); Yanbo Ru & Ellis Horowitz, Indexing the Invisible Web: A Survey, 29 ONLINE INFO. REV.
249 (2005); Danny Devriendt, Data Is Gold – 91,000 Terabytes of Uncharted Web: Welcome to the
Dark Side, PORTER NOVELLI BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011), http://blog.porternovelli.com/2011/04/11/data-isgold-%E2%80%93-91000-terabytes-of-uncharted-web-welcome-to-the-dark-side/ (“The dark Web, or
hidden Web is approximately 550 times bigger than the Web you experience daily.”); Russell Kay,
Quickstudy: Deep Web, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 19, 2005, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.
com/s/article/107097/Deep_Web (“[M]ore than 500 times as much information as traditional search
engines ‘know about’ is available in the deep Web.”); see also PAUL PEDLEY, THE INVISIBLE WEB:
SEARCHING THE HIDDEN PARTS OF THE INTERNET (2001); CHRIS SHERMAN & GARY PRICE, THE
INVISIBLE WEB: UNCOVERING INFORMATION SOURCES SEARCH ENGINES CAN’T SEE (2001).
7. See, e.g., boyd, supra note 1, at 133; Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary
Regulation in Social Media, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER
SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 769, 769–78 (2012), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
2145320&bnc=1.
8. See infra Part III.
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Part I of this Article explores the general concept of obscurity and the
vital role it plays in our everyday lives. Part II identifies the tactics and
strategies individuals employ to obscure themselves in online settings. Part III
discusses the law’s failure to embrace or develop the concept of online
obscurity. Part IV introduces the proposed definition and framework for online
obscurity. Finally, Part V details the ways obscurity could ameliorate some of
the tension between current privacy doctrine and the expectations of Internet
users.
I.
THE CONCEPT OF OBSCURITY
The American Heritage Dictionary defines obscure as “Not readily
noticed or seen; inconspicuous; . . . Not clearly understood or expressed;
ambiguous or vague.”9 We operationalize obscurity as a simple concept,
reflecting of a state of unknowing. In the context of interpersonal relations,
what does it mean for an individual to be obscure? Obscurity at the individual
level involves two parties: the individual and the observer. An individual is
obscure to an observer if the observer does not possess or comprehend critical
information needed to make sense of the individual. Personal identity, social
connections, and personal or situational context are examples of such critical
information. Without this information, the observer has a limited ability to
make sense of the actions and utterances of the individual. For example, if an
individual gossips in the presence of the observer, the gossip is generally
obscure unless the observer knows of whom the individual speaks. This “zone
of obscurity” protects individuals from identification while facilitating social
interaction.
We argue the case for obscurity for two reasons. First, we argue that
obscurity is a common and natural condition of interaction, and therefore
human expectation of obscurity will transfer to the domains in which we spend
time, both physical and virtual. Second, we argue that obscurity is a desirable
state because we are protected by an observer’s inability to comprehend our
actions, and therefore social practice encourages us to seek obscurity. To make
these arguments, we explore the cognitive and cultural logic of obscurity,
focusing particularly on evolutionary biologist Robin Dunbar’s analysis of
cognitive economy and how it produces obscurity, and sociologist Erving
Goffman’s analysis of interaction and how we enact obscurity in everyday life.
With this analysis, we demonstrate that obscurity is both a physically essential
state and one that is culturally recognized as desirable. We are then able to
extend our analysis to online settings, where obscurity is commonplace.

9. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1213 (4th ed. 2000),
available at http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=obscure (defining “obscure”).
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In arguing that obscurity is commonplace, we draw on Dunbar’s work to
illustrate the cognitive logic of obscurity. Dunbar’s work on the “Social Brain
Hypothesis” famously demonstrated that human cognitive groups—clusters of
individuals that have shared communication, memories, and interpersonal
relationships—are fairly small, with a maximum group size of approximately
150 members.10 Dunbar was careful to draw a distinction between simply
identifying and truly knowing people, pointing out that we can recognize about
2000 people, far more than the maximum number of people knowable at the
individual level.11 The Social Brain Hypothesis illustrates the evolutionary
logic of a limited cognitive group: to prevent the overburdening of memory, we
necessarily limit our cognitive groups to a manageable size.12 Accordingly,
most interactions outside of our cognitive groups occur in states of obscurity.
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger has extended this logic, highlighting work that
demonstrates that forgetting is a cognitive advantage.13 Our memories are
purposefully selective to prevent cognitive overburdening.14 This realistically
means that most of the individuals with whom we interact in passing, or share
common space in transit, are obscure to us and we to them—they are strangers.
Furthermore, obscurity in interactions with strangers produces notable effects,
such as conversational freedom.15 Most of us live a day-to-day existence where
we are only close to a few individuals.16 Genetic disposition toward obscurity is
therefore reinforced by everyday practice.
It is important not to conflate lack of personal identification with
anonymity. In everyday life, people identify others at varying personal and
social levels, such as through appearance, role or position, or ritual activity.17

10. See, e.g., R.I.M. Dunbar, Coevolution of Neocortical Size, Group Size and Language in
Humans, 16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681 (1993); R.I.M. Dunbar & M. Spoors, Social Networks,
Support Cliques, and Kinship, 6 HUM. NATURE 273 (1995).
11. Robin I.M. Dunbar, The Social Brain Hypothesis, 6 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY
178, 184 (1998).
12. Id. at 184.
13. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 16–49 (2009) (explaining why remembering is more resource intensive than forgetting).
14. Id. at 17–18.
15. John A. Bargh et al., Can You See the Real Me? Activation and Expression of the “True
Self” on the Internet, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 44–45 (2002).
16. There is some debate over measuring the size of human social groups, but even those
debating measurement methodology agree that the average number of people to whom one is truly
close—and nonobscure—to remains objectively small. See LEE RAINIE & BARRY WELLMAN,
NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL OPERATING SYSTEM 117–34 (2012) (discussing measurement of
personal networks, effects of online interaction on personal networks); Miller McPherson et al., Social
Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOC. REV.
353, 360 (2006) (establishing and updating core discussion network size). Notable exceptions to this
claim are celebrities or other highly identifiable individuals. See GRAEME TURNER, UNDERSTANDING
CELEBRITY 23–26, 46–51 (2004).
17. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); John M.
Levine et al., Social Foundations of Cognition, 44 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 592 (1993) (explaining
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For example, we are able to construct a set of expectations about a man
wearing a Roman collar without knowing his personal identity. We also come
to know those we interact with regularly but do not identify personally, such as
the neighbor who walks her dog at a certain time every day, or the barista that
serves morning coffee. These abstract identifications can lead to personal
identifications within groups, particularly in cases where an individual’s social
behavior deviates from the norm or expectation.18 Indeed, the possibility of
being identified tends to foster behavior that conforms to social norms, a
concept familiar to anyone who has been exhorted to behave a certain way
because “you never know who is watching.” Therefore, humans produce
obscurity by employing a range of strategies to increase the odds that their
actions or bodies cannot be fully comprehended (in some cases) or identified
(in others). Thus, it is important to explore how and why obscurity is produced
in everyday life.
As Goffman argues, processes of identification and comprehension are a
function of the range of signals we give off both purposefully and
accidentally.19 Our dress and demeanor convey “front-stage” signals—those we
intend our observers to draw upon as they make sense of our actions.20 Of
course, we also give off subconscious or accidental signals; it is often these
“back-stage” signals that truly enable observers to make sense of what they are
observing.21 For example, an individual effectuating a certain dialect may
momentarily slip up, unintentionally revealing information about social class or
background.22 According to Goffman, our ability to “read” a scene, and thus
appropriately judge how we present ourselves, is a critical component in social
interaction.23 We utilize a range of cues and physical structures to figure out
how we should present ourselves.24 For example, our understanding of the
private nature of a conversation is moderated by the presence of walls and
how some observers expect certain individuals to behave a certain way based on the “social position”
the observer perceives the individual to be in).
18. In off-line settings, individuals may seek personal information to explain observed deviant
behavior, such as finding out the backstory for why an unidentified neighbor did something rude. In
online settings, the role of deviant behavior has been shown to interact with group membership status.
See Zuoming Wang et al., Social Identification and Interpersonal Communication in ComputerMediated Communication: What You Do Versus Who You Are in Virtual Groups, 35 HUM. COMM.
RES. 59, 64–65 (2009).
19. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 17–21 (1959).
20. Id. at 22–30.
21. Id. at 111–22.
22. Id. at 39–47.
23. Of this particular challenge, Goffman writes,
Whatever else, our activity must be addressed to the other’s mind, that is, to the other’s
capacity to read our words and actions for evidence of our feelings, thoughts, and intent.
This confines what we say and do, but it also allows us to bring to bear all of the world to
which the other can catch allusions.
Erving Goffman, Felicity’s Condition, 89 AM. J. SOC. 1, 51 (1983).
24. See ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS 151–65 (1963).
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doors.25 These physical structures provide privacy and feature into the overall
structure and content of interpersonal interaction; we often say things behind a
closed door that we would not say in public.26
Following Goffman’s logic, we argue that individuals both consciously
and subconsciously attempt to “produce” obscurity to protect their persons
(defensively) or advance their goals (offensively). An individual effectuating an
accent may actually be using obscurity offensively to create an unrealistic
impression, whereas another individual may cloak herself or himself in
obscurity to prevent informational leakages. In both cases, the individual
“performs” an identity and draws upon cues from the audience of observers to
construct an optimized zone of obscurity.27
Obscurity is a biological and social process—one that is culturally and
cognitively embedded and reinforced through social interaction. The next
Section shows how our expectations of obscurity off-line impact our privacy
decisions online and how the practice of obscurity is enacted online, where
geography, identity presentation, and physical structure are different.
II.
THE PRODUCTION OF ONLINE OBSCURITY
When deciding to share information online, an individual follows implicit
and explicit rules, cultural norms, prior attitudes, expectations, and desired
outcomes.28 As is the case off-line, the choice to disclose information online is
the product of a complex and highly contextual decision process, where risks
are weighed against the potential rewards resulting from disclosure.29 As
illustrated in the preceding Section, people expect obscurity in everyday life; it
is the product of physical, social, and cognitive processes.30 Extending this
logic, we argue that obscurity is assumed, expected, and actively produced in
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The notion of a zone of obscurity being optimized is in line with the work of Irwin Altman
and Sandra Petronio, who both argue that privacy is regulated recursively and interactively with others.
See IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE,
TERRITORY, CROWDING (1975); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF
DISCLOSURE (2002).
28. See, e.g., Adam N. Joinson & Carina B. Paine, Self-Disclosure, Privacy and the Internet, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 237, 237–38 (Adam N. Joinson et al. eds.,
2007); Rob Kling et al., Assessing Anonymous Communication on the Internet: Policy Deliberations,
15 INFO. SOC’Y 79, 82–84 (1999); Su-Yu Zeng et al., Sharing Private Information Online: The
Mediator Effect of Social Exchange, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 231 (2009), available at http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=1593290&
ftid=652035&dwn=1&CFID=194561741&CFTOKEN=39062883.
29. See Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 129,
131–33 (2003), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=642635&bnc=1 (discussing the tensions
between privacy and publicity).
30. See supra Part I.
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online settings. Internet use is now so widespread that differences between
users and nonusers are largely attributable to socioeconomic or geographic
differences, as opposed to behavioral or attitudinal ones.31 Online obscurity is a
general expectation, and not the sole purview of a certain class of Internet user.
What does it mean to expect obscurity online? Empirical evidence shows
that individual use of the Internet is influenced by, and reflective of, existing
cognitive schemas.32 That is, our identities, expectations, roles, and norms will
often transfer to online settings.33 While the Internet theoretically affords the
opportunity for individuals to “be anyone,” in the age of ubiquitous social
media it is more likely that Internet use will reinforce off-line social
structures.34 Furthermore, although a number of legal opinions suggest
otherwise, empirical evidence demonstrates that individual use of the Internet
does not necessarily indicate the seeking of a wide audience.35 A person should
not expect fame or notoriety simply because she or he uses the Internet.
Multiple studies of user attention and audience online have revealed a “long
tail” distribution of attention online—the majority of attention online is
31. See, e.g., SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DIGITAL DIVISIONS:
THERE ARE CLEAR DIFFERENCES AMONG THOSE WITH BROADBAND CONNECTIONS, DIAL-UP
CONNECTIONS, AND NO CONNECTIONS AT ALL TO THE INTERNET (2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/165/report_display.asp; JOHN HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2009 (2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2009/10-Home-Broadband-Adoption-2009.aspx. As these reports clearly indicate, use and
nonuse of Internet resources is largely a function of socioeconomic and geographic factors. While it is
likely that a certain portion of the population opts out of the Internet for privacy-related reasons, the
proportion of individuals for whom this applies is so small it does not appear on nationally
representative studies. See, e.g., KATHRYN ZICKUHR & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, DIGITAL DIFFERENCES (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Digitaldifferences.aspx (noting that nonusers primary reasons involved lack of motivation, access to
resources, or difficulty in use). We speculate that while use or nonuse of the Internet is poorly
explained by privacy preferences, use and nonuse of certain applications may be better explained by
privacy preference.
32. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 16, at 126–31; Andreas Wimmer & Kevin Lewis,
Beyond and Below Racial Homophily: ERG Models of a Friendship Network Documented on
Facebook, 116 AM. J. SOC., 583, 588–600 (explaining the theoretical bases for racial homogeneity in
social networks).
33. See Wimmer & Lewis, supra note 32.
34. The reinforcement of social structure can be broadly categorized into two frames. The first
frame involves the replication of material and socioeconomic conditions and practices in online space,
which is often conceived of as the digital divide. See, e.g., KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., VIRTUAL
INEQUALITY: BEYOND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, 1–15, 60–73 (2003); Ritu Agarwal et al., Social
Interactions and the “Digital Divide”: Explaining Variations in Internet Use, 20 INFO. SYS. RES. 277,
277–94 (connecting internet use with peer behavior and social influence); Eszter Hargittai, Digital
Na(t)ives? Variation in Internet Skills and Uses Among Members of the “Net Generation,” 80 SOC.
INQUIRY 92, 108 (2010) (concluding that differences in web-use skills correlate with socioeconomic,
racial, and gender differences). The second frame is the replication of off-line network structures
online; that is, the degree to which online and off-line networks overlap, inherently forcing individuals
to fall into off-line social roles. See, e.g., RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 16, at 126–30 (discussing
the “diminishing” gap between physical space and cyberspace); Wimmer & Lewis, supra note 32, at
588–600 (discussing the important role off-line social structure exerts on online network formation).
35. See infra Part III.
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dedicated to a small number of producers, with the majority of content
producers having small audiences.36
While cognitive models of online participation are influenced by off-line
schemas, important differences remain between the two. Rob Kling et al.
discuss two major structural differences in online and off-line communication
in their analysis of online anonymity.37 First, online discussion is amenable to
“mass dissemination,” as messages posted online can be transmitted much
faster than through traditional means.38 Second, messages posted online have
“persistence,” in that messages can be replicated, archived, and essentially
made permanent through cheap digital copies.39 Similarly, social media scholar
danah boyd describes the four primary components of networked publics, or
digital public spheres for socio-technical interaction: persistence, searchability,
replicability, and invisibility of audiences.40 The core logic of boyd’s
persistence and replicability components mirrors Kling et al.’s discussion of
persistence and mass dissemination, so they are not discussed at length here.
Searchability, according to boyd, is a property of networked publics that
describes the ability of third parties to quickly and efficiently “search” a public,
through a keyword search.41 There is no parallel in off-line space, boyd
argues—no universal mechanism that allows instantaneous searching through
all possible geographies.42 The term “invisible audiences” refers to the state of
unknowing that is common in online disclosure.43 When sharing a post or tweet
online, we have a general idea who will see our content, but we cannot know if
our message will be seen by unanticipated audiences. Compare this to the offline equivalent: when we disclose in public, we generally have an idea of who
the entire audience is, even if we do not actually know the audience. Because
disclosures online are persistent, people have a hard time predicting where
these disclosures will go, or who will see them, further incentivizing Internet
users to seek online obscurity.44
The challenge faced by users of Internet technologies when managing
personal disclosure online is the pressure to act within socially constructed
36. See, e.g., Andrei Broder et al., Graph Structure in the Web, 33 COMPUTER NETWORKS 309
(2000); Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. ACM 604
(1999). For an applied discussion of attention networks in Twitter, see Meeyoung Cha et al.,
Measuring User Influence in Twitter: The Million Follower Fallacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH
INTERNATIONAL AAAI CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 10 (2010), available at
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM10/paper/view/1538/1826.
37. Kling et al., supra note 28, at 87.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. boyd, supra note 1, at 120, 126.
41. Id. at 120.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 126, 131–34. For example, consider the case of Aleksy Vayner, whose video resume
“Impossible Is Nothing” became an Internet meme. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 171–78 (2007).
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rules of interpersonal disclosure, which draw strongly on off-line norms, while
also managing privacy and disclosure goals in light of key structural
differences in the online environment. The rise of social media, perhaps
surprisingly, indicates our expectation of obscurity online and illustrates how
obscurity is more important than ever for managing online disclosures. In the
following Sections, we explore the practice of online obscurity. We
demonstrate that people seek and expect online obscurity as they do off-line
and that obscurity is an increasingly important and pervasive technique for
managing individual disclosure online.
A. Finding Obscurity in Nonymous Environments
In recent years, the development and adoption of technologies that enable
the peer production of Internet content45 have resulted in dramatic increases in
online participation and sharing. According to the Pew Internet and American
Life Project, nearly 75 percent of all adults use the Internet, and virtually all
teens aged twelve to seventeen (93 percent) are Internet users.46 While the
broad-based growth and adoption of Internet technologies is a remarkable
story, the changing nature of Internet use is equally remarkable. The explosion
in peer-produced content, particularly social network sites and microblogs, has
led to the production of a large amount of identity-centric (“nonymous”)
content—where individuals are both the producers and consumers of content
about themselves.47 This shift towards identity-centric content is dramatic, and
has serious implications for both privacy and identity online. Shanyang Zhao et
al. characterize the implications of “nonymous technologies” and the
challenges for researchers and scholars:
Identity construction in a nonymous online environment has not been
well studied. Unlike the anonymous setting in which individuals feel
free to be whatever they want to, the nonymous environment places
constraints on the freedom of identity claims. A faculty member on his
or her departmental listserv, for example, cannot claim to be someone
else without prompting an immediate inquiry. This certainly does not
suggest that there will be no self-presentation in nonymous online
45. See, e.g., BLOGGER, http://www.blogger.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012); TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); WORDPRESS.COM,
http://wordpress.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
46. See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ADULTS AND SOCIAL
NETWORK WEBSITES (2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/272/report_display.aspx;
AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS, PRIVACY AND
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS (2007), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/211/report_
display.asp; AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA AND
YOUNG ADULTS (2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-YoungAdults.aspx.
47. Shanyang Zhao et al., Identity Construction on Facebook: Digital Empowerment in
Anchored Relationships, 24 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1816, 1818–19 (2008) (citations omitted).
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environments. Identity performance takes place even in places where
individuals are fully identifiable, such as in classrooms and offices, but
self-performances in such contexts are constrained and tend to
conform to established social norms. Depending on the degrees of
nonymity in the given situation, the level of conformity varies
accordingly.48
As Zhao et al. note, the shift from anonymous to nonymous
communication in online settings poses a number of challenges. First,
nonymous communication online is not well studied; scholarship on computermediated communication has, until recently, heavily focused on the challenges
and opportunities of anonymous or deindividuated communication settings.49
Second, there is a relatively novel overlap between nonymous mediated
communication settings and off-line settings.50 With the growth of peerproduced content, we are increasingly communicating nonymously online with
the same people with whom we interact off-line.51 For this reason, privacy
management in nonymous online communication requires the management of
overlaps and boundaries in off-line networks—if a person wishes to
communicate nonymously yet maintain control over disclosures, she or he must
develop strategies that permit selective or targeted disclosures. In the following
Section, we review literature that identifies some of these techniques of
managed disclosure. In doing so, we demonstrate that the practice of obscurity
is useful for communicating in variably nonymous environments.
B. Finding Obscurity in Socio-Technical Systems
In recent years, a number of studies have explored the novel challenges of
privacy and disclosure management in the nonymous—and increasingly
heterogeneous—social media space. The problem generally explored concerns
the shifting nature of privacy and disclosure management in online spaces as
audiences diversify. Consider the case of Facebook—it was once a student-only
network but now crosses broad swaths of the population.52 How do individuals
manage privacy and disclosure, and the goals and outcomes associated with
sharing in the network, as audiences shift? Joan M. DiMicco and David R.
Millen described a vivid example of inherent network diversification as

48. Id.
49. See, e.g., NANCY BAYM, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 50–58 (2010).
50. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 16, at 126–30.
51. Cliff Lampe et al., A Face(Book) in the Crowd: Social Searching vs. Social Browsing, in
CSCW ’06 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 20TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER
SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 167 (2006), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1180901&bnc=1 (discussing the online network construction of college students). For a more general
discussion of online-off-line overlaps, see, for example, RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 16, at 126–
30.
52. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY
THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 15–17, 275 (2010).
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students move from college to their first job at a technology firm.53 Using
surveys, the authors developed social network site profile “types” identifying a
simple and highly functional disclosure management strategy.54 In particular,
DiMicco and Millen found that people at different levels of the organizational
structure operate differently in social media, with adoption and disclosure
levels negatively correlating with organizational embeddedness.55 Individuals
that were more strongly embedded in the network (i.e., more senior) were more
likely to have limited profiles and to limit disclosures.
DiMicco and Millen’s study was conducted in 2007, and adoption of
Facebook was not as broad based then as it is today.56 Later work conducted by
Meredith M. Skeels and Jonathan Grudin57 extended this line of inquiry,
analyzing the techniques individuals use to manage disclosure across multiple
audiences in a similar work environment. The authors focus on the challenges
of disclosing across multiple groups—as social network sites are more broadly
adopted, individuals are challenged to manage disclosure across the personal
networks within the site.58 One particular source of tension is the family
network and family interactions with work networks.59 In establishing
friendships across social hierarchies, individuals are required to maintain a
coherent identity across these hierarchies—a significant challenge.60 Airi
Lampinen et al. documented strategies individuals use to manage identity
across network boundaries.61 The authors describe the use of both behavioral
and mental strategies for boundary management.62 Behavioral strategies
include using social network sites selectively (e.g., maintaining a “personal”
and “business” account) or “self-censoring” certain types of content.63
Examples of mental strategies include developing interpersonal arrangements
53. Joan Morris DiMicco & David R. Millen, Identity Management: Multiple Presentations of
Self in Facebook, in GROUP ’07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 INTERNATIONAL ACM CONFERENCE
ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 383 (2007), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1316682.
54. Id. at 384.
55. See id. at 384–86.
56. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 52, at 16, 275.
57. Meredith M. Skeels & Jonathan Grudin, When Social Networks Cross Boundaries: A Case
Study of Workplace Use of Facebook and LinkedIn, in GROUP ’09: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2009
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 95 (2009), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1531689.
58. Id. at 100–01.
59. Id. at 96, 100–01.
60. Id. at 102–03.
61. Airi Lampinen et al., All My People Right Here, Right Now: Management of Group Copresence on a Social Networking Site, in GROUP ’09: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2009
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 281 (2009) [hereinafter Lampinen et
al., All My People], available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1531717; Airi Lampinen et al.,
We’re in It Together: Interpersonal Management of Disclosure in Social Network Services, in CHI
’11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS
(2011), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1979420.
62. Lampinen et al., All My People, supra note 61, at 287.
63. Id. at 287–89.
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to manage disclosure or specifying trust relations around certain types of
disclosures.64
As we have argued, the selective management of identity is a natural and
commonly occurring phenomenon, and individuals have been managing their
identities online since before the rise of social media. The use of simple
obfuscation techniques, such as pseudonyms,65 confidentiality agreements,
relational (in-group) knowledge, and techniques of true anonymity (such as
encryption) have been long accessible to users of Internet technology.66
Kuanchin Chen and Alan I. Rea extended this analysis, identifying three
primary types of techniques used by online participants to manage identity
disclosures.67 First is the falsification of information shared online, which
involves techniques such as using multiple email accounts, deleting cookies,
and lying to websites.68 Second is passive reaction, which involves the use (or
destruction) of technology that would connect a person to his or her online
footprints.69 Third is identity modification, which involves the creation of
gender-neutral avatar names, and the use of online identities that are
disassociated from the personal identity.70 We identify these techniques to
demonstrate that active identity management has been an integral part of our
experience with online disclosure, and to highlight some of the important
differences introduced by the current state of Internet technology, particularly
the nonymous social web. When an individual faces censure from her or his
peer group for lying publicly, or when the use of a throwaway identifier means
losing one’s friends list, it becomes obvious that certain extant techniques of
identity protection are not available to participants in nonymous environments.
We argue that a lack of access to existing identity protection techniques is
not a tacit dismissal of their value but a catalyst for creativity. Individuals do
not abandon their desire for privacy; rather, they seek privacy in contextually
appropriate ways. Consider “mirror networks,” one of the earliest documented
“innovations” in privacy and disclosure control to emerge from social media.71
Teenage users of social media sites increasingly faced the specter of
surveillance from parents and other individuals of authority.72 Rather than
withdrawing from social network sites, the teenagers created densely
64. Id. For example, individuals might agree “how far” interpersonal disclosures should travel
(i.e., whether they should be kept secret, shared only with close friends, or disclosed to everyone).
65. See, e.g., Houn-Gee Chen et al., Online Privacy Control Via Anonymity and Pseudonym:
Cross-cultural Implications, 27 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 229 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Kling et al., supra note 28, at 81–82.
67. Kuanchin Chen & Alan I. Rea, Jr., Protecting Personal Information Online: A Survey of
User Privacy Concerns and Control Techniques, 44 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS. 85, 87–88 (2004).
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id. Chen and Rea provide examples such as deleting unnecessary accounts or ignoring
contact or email requests. Id. at 90.
70. Id.
71. boyd, supra note 1, at 132.
72. Id. at 131–34.
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interconnected mirror profiles—highly sanitized copies of the profile that were
densely connected within the personal friend network.73 In essence, these
profiles created an alternate reality where parents could snoop, and teenagers
enjoyed privacy in completely separate, hidden zones of obscurity.74
The authors’ own empirical research has explored the privacy practices of
social media users, focusing particularly on those that used multiple profiles as
an identity management strategy.75 In a similar vein to the work of Lampinen
and colleagues, this research explored the challenges of, and reaction to,
increasingly heterogeneous disclosure networks within social media.76
Maintaining multiple profiles within social network sites represents an active
“segmentation” of the site into multiple zones of obscurity.77 Most commonly,
social networks are segmented along important network boundaries such as
family, work, and public persona.78 Depending on the importance of the linkage
between these personas, individuals use various techniques to “cloak” personas,
such as employing privacy settings, using obscure name variants, and highly
regulating the off-line disclosure of the existence of the profile.79
The use of multiple profiles represents an innovative approach to the
challenges of disclosure within the platform, but it also represents a
fundamental failing of the platform to respect disclosure and privacy intent.
Work by Heather Richter Lipford et al. attempted to rectify this through the
design of technologies that adaptively match privacy intent to disclosure goals
in social network sites.80 In particular, Lipford et al. drew on Helen
Nissenbaum’s notion of contextual integrity81 as a metaphor for system
design.82 If users are given control over disclosures, they may be better able to
73. Id. at 132.
74. In the mirror profile, the individuals are protected by multiple layers of privacy.
Individuals use pseudonyms and draw heavily on protected in-group communication to cloak both the
actors and the nature of the communication. This renders the networks practically “hidden” from
existing techniques that could be employed to discover them, particularly text search. Id.
75. Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 7.
76. Id. at 771–72.
77. Id. at 775–76.
78. Id. at 773–76.
79. Id. at 772–73.
80. See, e.g., Andrew Besmer & Heather Richter Lipford, Moving Beyond Untagging: Photo
Privacy in a Tagged World, in CHI ’10: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1563 (2010), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1753560; Heather Richter Lipford et al., Visible Flows: Contextual Integrity and the Design of Privacy
Mechanisms on Social Network Sites, in 4 CSE ’09 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 985 (2009), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1633633; Katherine Strater & Heather Richter Lipford, Strategies
and Struggles with Privacy in an Online Social Networking Community, in 1 BCS-HCI ’08
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND BRITISH HCI GROUP ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON PEOPLE AND
COMPUTERS: CULTURE, CREATIVITY, INTERACTION 111 (2008), available at http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1531530.
81. See infra Part III.
82. Lipford et al., supra note 80, at 985–86.
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share information in accordance with their goals and desires, and they will not
have to react reflexively to systems and algorithms.83
Although social media is often thought of as a public, nonymous space,
we have demonstrated that individuals employ a range of practices to manage
and optimize their privacy. In particular, individuals exert control over the
information they disclose by limiting the audience of the disclosure, by
bounding the meaning of the disclosure, and by reflexively adapting the
disclosure to the site. In social media, where anonymity often violates social
norms or site terms, individuals strategically develop techniques that effectively
produce obscurity in disclosure. This is not to say that established techniques of
privacy management are invalid in these domains, but rather that new
techniques that are contextually appropriate emerge so individuals can maintain
their expectation of privacy and obscurity.
A powerful popular discourse argues that individuals have essentially
different privacy and notoriety goals online than they do off-line.84 It is
therefore essential that we provide evidence that obscurity online is socially
expected and desired. The previous two Sections have attempted to
demonstrate that online obscurity is a crucial aspect of privacy for Internet
users. As we have demonstrated, obscurity is both expected and desired online.
The next Part discusses how, even though obscurity is a central aspect of online
privacy, the concept is languishing in privacy law.
III.
THE SPECTER OF OBSCURITY IN ONLINE PRIVACY LAW
The well-documented problem with the current state of privacy law is that
it simply does not reflect societal or individual notions of privacy.85 The
purpose of this Section is to demonstrate how the law has failed to embrace or
develop the concept of online obscurity. Even when obscurity appears implicit
in a number of disputes, courts seem to wrap it into larger or different concepts

83. Id. at 987–89. For example, Facebook would have respected user privacy and avoided a
user revolt if users were able to “opt in” to the Facebook newsfeed. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 52,
at 189–95.
84. See, e.g., Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 12, 2007, at 24–29, 102–03,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/27341/.
85. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 104–26 (2010) [hereinafter NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT];
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1–37 (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY]; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004)
[hereinafter Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity]; Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in
an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998) [hereinafter
Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age]; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
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of privacy law, such as “public” information.86 Although courts and scholars
have approached the disconnect between law and individual notions of privacy
from a number of angles, many conflicts seem to stem from one problem—
individuals have complex notions of privacy in regard to personal information
but the law tends to treat that information only two ways: public or private.87
This maligned on/off approach to privacy has been called the “public-private
dichotomy”88 or “secrecy paradigm.”89
Although this dichotomy has distorted the societal expectations of privacy
before the Internet, it has proven to be even more unworkable online. This Part
highlights the failure of courts and lawmakers to embrace online obscurity. The
need for a workable concept of online obscurity is as important as determining
what constitutes “public” online information. This Part will first review the
public/private dichotomy in privacy law and critics’ arguments as to why it is
flawed. This Part will then explore case law concerning online disclosure.
While these cases show that courts have failed to adequately consider obscurity
in analyzing whether information is public, they also suggest that courts might
be willing to embrace an obscurity paradigm. Finally, this Part will examine
statutes and regulations that implicitly value obscurity as a means to protect
privacy but fail to adequately conceptualize obscurity.
A. The Public/Private Dichotomy
Daniel Solove describes the “secrecy paradigm” as an understanding of
privacy based on concealment preventing others from invading one’s hidden
world.90 Under this conception, disclosed information is no longer concealed
and, thus, no longer private.91 Sharon Sandeen noted that this vision of privacy
“makes it difficult for individuals to protect personal information once it has
been shared with others.”92 Solove argued that the secrecy paradigm “fails to

86. See, e.g., United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
87. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1177 (2002) (noting that when privacy is equated with secrecy, “[i]nformation
is categorized as either public or private. . . . Understood this way, information has a particular status; it
can either be in one domain or another. The law often treats information in this black-and-white
manner; either it is wholly private or wholly public.”).
88. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 85, at 113–25; Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, supra note 85, at 136.
89. Solove, supra note 87, at 42.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade
Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 694. Online obscurity has also appeared in the trade secret
literature. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2007). Rowe asked the question of trade
secret doctrine: “Does public mean public accessibility or public publication? Does the obscurity of the
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recognize that individuals want to keep things private from some people but not
others.”93 The concept of obscurity can play a key role in addressing the issues
that the secrecy paradigm overlooks.
Disclosing information to some, but not all, is difficult in modern society.
Solove asserts that not all private activities are pure secrets
in the sense that they occur in isolation and in hidden corners. When
we talk in a restaurant, we do not expect to be listened to. A person
may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication in a store open to the
public, but certainly expects these purchases to be private activities.94
Solove recognizes the utility of obscurity. Regarding doctrinal notions of
“public,” Solove claims that even though many argue that public records cannot
be considered private, “there is a considerable loss of privacy by plucking
inaccessible facts buried in some obscure [public] document and broadcasting
them to the world on the evening news. Privacy can be infringed even if no
secrets are revealed and even if nobody is watching us.”95 In other words,
context is important when considering whether information is considered
public or private.
Solove and other scholars have pondered whether secrecy is even possible
in a networked world. In a separate article, Solove posits that life in the
Information Age “often involves exchanging information with third parties,
such as phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies,
merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy
would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”96
Helen Nissenbaum argues that the public/private dichotomy fails to
consider context, which rationalizes an individual’s desire to have “privacy in
public.”97 The relegation of information into public and private “spheres” is rife
with challenges, as “[i]nterpretations of what counts as a private space may
vary across times, societies, and cultures.”98 Nissenbaum observed that the
common rebuttals to claims of privacy in public are:
[W]hen people move about and do things in public arenas, they have
implicitly yielded any expectation of privacy. Much as they might
prefer that others neither see, nor take note, expecting others not to see,
notice, or make use of information so gained would be unreasonably

Web site matter, or are all Internet postings equal? . . . The precise measure of obscurity or transience
required to protect the trade secret, however, is unsettled.” Id.
93. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 43–44 (2004).
94. Id. at 44; see also infra Parts I and II.
95. SOLOVE, supra note 93, at 44.
96. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 85, at 1152.
97. Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age, supra note 85, at 559 n.2. See also
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 85; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, supra note 85.
98. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 85, at 132.
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restrictive of others’ freedoms. One cannot reasonably insist that
people avert their eyes, not look out their windows, or not notice what
others have placed in their supermarket trolleys. And if we cannot stop
them from looking, we cannot stop them remembering and telling
others. In 2001, Tampa police, defending their use of video cameras to
scan faces one-by-one as they entered the Super Bowl stadium, stated,
“the courts have ruled that there is no expectation of privacy in a
public setting.”99
In essence, information that falls within the private half of the public/private
dichotomy warrants privacy consideration; “for all the rest, anything goes.”100
Nissenbaum also rejects the public/private distinction in law. Instead, she
proposes a framework of privacy called “contextual integrity,” based on the
central tenet that “there are no arenas of life not governed by norms of
information flow, no information or spheres of life for which ‘anything
goes.’”101 Thus, the idea that information can objectively be “public” or
categorically undeserving of privacy protection is countered by the fact that
“[a]lmost everything—things that we do, events that occur, transactions that
take place—happens in a context not only of place but of politics, convention,
and cultural expectation.”102The integrity of these contexts is preserved when
norms of appropriateness and the flow of information are maintained, and this
maintenance of contextual norms is the hallmark of privacy.103 As will be
discussed in Part IV, our proposed definition and framework for online
obscurity is based on Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity.
Other scholars commenting on the secrecy paradigm have noted the
practical and constitutional difficulty in defining the term “public” in order to
determine if information is worthy of privacy protections.104 Dianne
Zimmerman explains that “[t]o distinguish private facts from ‘public’
information about an individual, courts often look either to the location of the
action or to the nature of the subject matter. Courts using the ‘location’ analysis
commonly state that information individuals reveal about themselves in public
places is by definition not private.”105 Courts using the subject matter analysis
“rule that the subject matter is private even though the locus is not.”106

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 135–36 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach,
11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
105. Zimmerman, supra note 104, at 347.
106. Id. at 348.
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Zimmerman found that both approaches are practically unfeasible and threaten
freedom of speech.107
Not all scholars have found the public/private dichotomy problematic.
Heidi Reamer Anderson defines obscurity simply as “the absence of
exposure.”108 Anderson defends the public/private dichotomy as beneficial to
resolving the “obscurity problem,” which occurs when a private actor lawfully
collects and further exposes information that someone else initially shared in
public.109 However, this definition of obscurity is unhelpful for the purposes of
this Article, because it relies on the same conception of “public” as the
public/private dichotomy. Thus, it does not reflect research that demonstrates
the significant role obscurity plays in the disclosure of information online. As
demonstrated in Part II of this Article, obscurity is not simply an incidental
benefit conferred when disclosing information online; it is a crucial aspect
influencing disclosure and regularly relied upon by Internet users.
The public/private dichotomy in the law is flawed because it relies on
largely arbitrary distinctions that fail to reflect Internet users’ notions of
privacy. Courts faced with Internet privacy disputes too often simply shuttle
online information into one category or another with little discussion as to why.
Perhaps even more problematic, courts and lawmakers rely too much on one
specific technology, like passwords, to define what information is public. As
the following Sections demonstrate, privacy disputes are littered with examples
of online obscurity, yet courts fail to recognize the concept. A concrete and
usable definition of obscurity would help courts and lawmakers resolve privacy
disputes by better reflecting the reality of the online disclosure of information.
B. Obscurity: The Elephant in the Courtroom
Courts have not explicitly embraced the concept of online obscurity, but
its existence is hard to ignore in a number of disputes. This Section will detail
how judicial support for the analog version of online obscurity—practical
obscurity—has laid the foundation for the recognition of online obscurity. This
Section will also explore how obscurity has been glossed over in online
disputes where courts attempt to define information as public or private. This
Section will look at different obfuscation techniques and contexts such as
passwords, privacy settings, and encryption; shared or networked access to
online information; and search visibility.
Applying the public/private dichotomy, courts have seemed to reach one
common conclusion—the unfettered ability of any hypothetical individual to
107. Id. at 344–50.
108. Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No
Privacy in Public, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 551 (2012).
109. Id. at 550–51. Anderson ultimately concludes that “a potential loss in obscurity is a small
price to pay for . . . [the benefits gained from transparency], and that the ‘no privacy in public’ rule
generally remains valid.” Id. at 602.
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find and access information on a website renders that information “public,” or
ineligible for privacy protection. Finally, this Section details the problematic
tendency of courts to rely on passwords to define what information is public—
another reason a workable definition of online obscurity is needed.
1. Practical Obscurity
Online obscurity has an older sibling—“practical obscurity.” This
concept, which typically focuses on off-line impediments to data retrieval, was
articulated by the Supreme Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press.110 In evaluating the privacy of a “rap
sheet” containing aggregated public records, the Supreme Court found a
privacy interest in information that was technically available to the public, but
could only be found by spending a burdensome and unrealistic amount of time
and effort in obtaining it.111 The information was considered practically
obscure because of the extremely high cost and low likelihood of the
information being compiled by the public.112 Thus, practical obscurity became
a recognized, yet undeveloped, concept in privacy doctrine. The doctrine has
largely been confined to disputes involving access to public records,113
computer security,114 and governmental searches.115 Beyond a general sense
110. 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989).
111. Id. at 764. The Court found:
The very fact that federal funds have been spent to prepare, index, and maintain these
criminal-history files demonstrates that the individual items of information in the
summaries would not otherwise be “freely available” either to the officials who have access
to the underlying files or to the general public. Indeed, if the summaries were “freely
available,” there would be no reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to the information
they contain. Granted, in many contexts the fact that information is not freely available is no
reason to exempt that information from a statute generally requiring its dissemination. But
the issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the
privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that information.
Id.
112. Id. at 764, 780.
113. See, e.g., Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 301 (2003) (“Digital technology is turning the asset of open government into a privacy
nightmare. In the analog age, public records were all available, but languished in ‘practical obscurity’
in courthouse basements or isolated file cabinets.”); Lewis A. Kaplan, Litigation, Privacy and the
Electronic Age, 4 YALE SYMP. ON L. & TECH 1, ¶ 6 (2001) (“This practical obscurity of information
generated in all but the most exceptional cases has been eroded by technological advances.”); Caren
Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for
Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921 (2009); Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information
Management in an Electronic Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135 (2009);
Arminda Bradford Bepko, Note, Public Availability or Practical Obscurity: The Debate over Public
Access to Court Records on the Internet, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 967 (2005); Kristen M. Blankley,
Note, Are Public Records Too Public? Why Personally Identifying Information Should Be Removed
from Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 413 (2004).
114. Computer security through obscurity involves a slightly different set of concerns than
user privacy. Obscurity is not favored as a computer security technique. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA. L. REV.
1701, 1724 (2010) (“Not only do reidentification scientists spurn security through obscurity, but they
often assume that the adversary possesses the exact piece of data—if it exists—needed to unlock
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that shared or available information does not always constitute public
information, courts have had a difficult time expanding upon the concept.116
Doctrinal support for practical obscurity forms the foundation for utilizing
the concept of obscurity in online disputes.117 In Burnett v. County of
Bergen,118 the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the redaction of social
security numbers from court records because their inclusion with other personal
information elevated privacy concerns. Even though these social security
anonymized identities, in order to design responses that protect identity even in this worst case.”); cf.
Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source,
Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1350–51 (2006)
(“‘Obscurity is camouflage, security is armor.’ Either can be useful, depending on the circumstances.
They can also be useful when working together, much as tanks are often camouflaged.”).
115. A few have advocated online obscurity in the context of governmental searches. See, e.g.,
David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving
Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205 (2009). Couillard also argued for a
recognition of online obscurity, stating:
Courts should . . . acknowledge the legitimacy of virtual concealment efforts—encryption,
password protection, and the practical obscurity of unlisted links—as means of opacity in
the cloud context. Under this rule, courts would make a case-by-case determination as to
whether a user’s reliance upon a password, encryption, or obscurity was a reasonable effort
to conceal in a given situation. It is not a burden for law enforcement to determine whether
a password is necessary to access a website, at which point it would need a warrant prior to
accessing the account. Conversely, in the unlisted-link context, if an unlisted address
appears on a public website as a hyperlink, law enforcement should be given discretion to
treat such a virtual container as in plain view.
Id. at 2236; see also Carla Scherr, You Better Watch Out, You Better Not Frown, New Video
Surveillance Techniques Are Already in Town (and Other Public Spaces), 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 499, 506 (2008) (“The concept of ‘practical obscurity’ applies to public information that
is usually outside the public consciousness because it is contained in a large number of individual
pieces that are practically impossible to accumulate and organize, or because it is impossible to find,
for example a paper document stored in the dusty basement of the local courthouse or in an infinitely
large government warehouse.”); Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy
Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 108 (2006)
(“[A] user could only try to argue that a MySpace profile is not public knowledge, and that it is so
obscure as to force the police to go searching for the profile. This obscurity . . . could be argued to
deem some expectation of a private area.”).
116. A number of scholars have argued that the traditional notion of practical obscurity, which
relied on off-line impediments to discovery, no longer exists in a digital world. See, e.g., Elbert Lin,
Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100–
01 (2002) (“[W]hile the scattering of information throughout numerous computer databases had
preserved some practical obscurity, the Internet has all but eliminated those remnants of isolation.”);
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 501 (2010) (“While before
there was a fair amount of practical obscurity of information gathered in a public place, today the
potential for immediate global dissemination of that information is unprecedented. Once information is
available online, it is impossible to put the genie back in the bottle.”); Omar Tene, What Google
Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1440 (“Before . . . search
engines, we enjoyed a degree of ‘practical obscurity.’ . . . [Information] was protected de facto from all
but skilled investigators or highly motivated researchers, due to the practical difficulty and costs
involved in uncovering and compiling the data. Today such information has become available instantly
and free of charge through search engines . . . .”).
117. See, e.g., In re French v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 401 B.R. 295 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009);
Finnerty v. State Bank & Trust Co., 687 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen,
968 A.2d 1151 (N.J. 2009); Lambert v. Hartmann, 898 N.E.2d 67 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
118. 968 A.2d at 1154.
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numbers were freely available to the public in the clerk’s office, the court noted
that the “bulk disclosure of realty records to a company planning to include
them in a searchable, electronic database would eliminate the practical
obscurity that now envelops those records at the Bergen County Clerk’s
Office.”119
The court cited Reporters Committee, which held that “there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout
the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.”120 The court went on to say that “composite documents—in this
case records that would be made available in a searchable computer database—
implicate privacy concerns much more broadly than documents with one item
alone.”121
This same principle compelled the Supreme Court of Michigan in
Michigan Federation of Teachers v. University of Michigan122 to conclude that
university employees’ home addresses and telephone numbers were protected
by the Michigan Freedom of Information Act’s privacy exemption. The court
stated:
It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through
sources such as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but
“[i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time
or another divulged to another.” The privacy interest protected by [the
federal exemption] “encompass[es] the individual’s control of
information concerning his or her person.” An individual’s interest in
controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal
matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be
available to the public in some form.123
The court reasoned that “[a]n individual’s home address and telephone number
might be listed in the telephone book or available on an Internet website, but he
might nevertheless understandably refuse to disclose this information, when
asked, to a stranger, a co-worker, or even an acquaintance.”124 This analysis
recognizes the value of obscure information. Employees’ addresses and phone
numbers were freely accessible by those seeking to find them, but were obscure
in certain contexts and, thus, not “public.”
While many cases support the concept of “practical obscurity,” which
usually involves off-line limitations to accessing information, courts have been
119. Id. at 1164.
120. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
764 (1989)).
121. Id.
122. 753 N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 2008).
123. Id. at 42 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500
(1994)).
124. Id.
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less receptive to a purely online concept of obscurity. Instead, they typically
rely on the secrecy paradigm. In the case of Yath v. Fairview Clinics, the Court
of Appeals of Minnesota wrote that
[i]t is true that mass communication is no longer limited to a tiny
handful of commercial purveyors and that we live with much greater
access to information than the era in which the tort of invasion of
privacy developed. A town crier could reach dozens, a handbill
hundreds, a newspaper or radio station tens of thousands, a television
station millions, and now a publicly accessible webpage can present
the story of someone’s private life, in this case complete with a
photograph and other identifying features, to more than one billion
Internet surfers worldwide.125
In J.S. v. Bethlehem School District, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
stated,
[T]he creator of a web-site controls the site until such time as it is
posted in the Internet. Once it is posted, the creator loses control of the
web-site’s destiny and it may be accessed by anyone on the Internet.
Without protecting the web-site, the creator takes the risk of other
individuals accessing it once it is posted.126
This kind of analysis reflecting a perceived omnipresent disclosure is
typical of the case law regarding “public” information. Yet it presents a false
dichotomy between complete worldwide dissemination and near total secrecy.
Website users have many different tools to regulate access and dissemination of
information. They can disclose only to certain users by activating privacy
settings, protecting their website with a password, and delisting their website
from search engines with robot.txt files.127 As will be discussed in Part IV, the
concept of online obscurity could be expanded and clarified, which would
make it more useful. The next two Sections will explore cases where courts
have either ignored obscurity or limited their analyses of the concept to
technological restrictions like passwords.
3. “Unlimited” Access
Courts typically presume that online information is “public” if anyone can
find and access it, thereby ignoring any concept of obscurity.128 A good
125. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
126. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
127. See Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65.
128. See, e.g., Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010); Guest v. Leis, 255
F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Users would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
materials intended for publication or public posting.”); Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D.
Me. 2008); United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 2007); Four Navy Seals v.
Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2005); United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp.
2d 205 (D.P.R. 2002); Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Ct. App.
2009); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Birchfield, No. 0408-00132, 2007 WL 1437235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 17, 2007).
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example of this tendency is United States v. Gines-Perez.129 In Gines-Perez, the
U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico considered whether the use of a photograph
that police downloaded from a website violated the defendant’s right to
privacy.130 The defendant claimed that the police obtained the downloaded
picture from a “private” website.131 Specifically, the defendant claimed that the
general public could not access the site, that it was not being used for
commercial purposes, and that it was under construction.132
The court found that the defendant had no subjective or reasonable
expectation of privacy in the photographs posted online.133 The court
unequivocally ruled that “placing information on the information superhighway
necessarily makes said matter accessible to the public, no matter how many
protectionist measures may be taken, or even when a web page is ‘under
construction.’”134 The court noted that the intention of the communicator in
posting information online is irrelevant.135 Instead, “it is the medium in which
he or she places the information and the nature of the materials placed on the
Web which are important. A person who places information on the information
superhighway clearly subjects said information to being accessed by every
conceivable interested party.”136
Regarding the reasonableness of a claim to privacy, the court in GinesPerez found that a “reasonable person cannot place ‘private’ information—such
as a ‘private’ photograph—on the Internet, if he or she desires to keep such
information in actual ‘privacy.’ A reasonable person does not protect his
private pictures by placing them on an Internet site.”137 Despite its earlier
declaration that the intent of the discloser was irrelevant, the court then
pronounced that society would most likely recognize “that a person who places
a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly such as here, where the Defendant
129. 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 225. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is a complex and often maligned
doctrine requiring analysis beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient for the purposes of this
Article to acknowledge that courts generally hold that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in “public” information for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Donald R.C. Pongrace,
Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1196, 1206–11 (1985). For more information, see, for example, Gerald G.
Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV.
1289 (1981); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment
Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 (2010); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1987).
134. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled
access to the Web page or photograph itself.”138 As we argued in Part II,
empirical research demonstrates that users do not intend to renounce privacy
rights when posting on the Internet. Yet the type of analysis employed in
Gines-Perez persists.
For example, in Sandler v. Calcagni, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine held that information contained on a “publicly accessible
myspace.com webpage” was not a private fact.139 In State v. Birchfield, the
Superior Court of New Jersey held that the “defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in [a] chat room, which was conducted as an open
discussion forum which any adult member of the public could join.” 140
Finally, in Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California considered whether military personnel
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in website photos that a journalist
found via a search engine.141 The journalist accessed and downloaded these
photos “without the necessity of keying in any password, entering a code or
incurring a monetary charge.”142 The court found that the journalist’s “act of
downloading photos from a publicly-accessible website . . . was not an
egregious breach of social norms underlying the state privacy right.”143 Rather,
it found that “one cannot reasonably expect the [I]nternet posting of photos to
be private.”144
As we will discuss, search visibility is a critical component of online
privacy but courts should not consider availability of information as the sole
factor in their analyses. Barriers to access, such as passwords, codes, and
monetary charges, are also effective and forceful tools for the creation and
maintenance of online obscurity. However, these barriers—particularly
passwords—often seem to be the only obscurity factor that courts consider. The
following cases demonstrate how courts have recognized that restricted
websites might be considered private under various thresholds, even though
completely unprotected websites are ineligible for privacy protection. Yet,
without a definition of online obscurity, the cases reveal that courts are likely to
end their analyses after considering barriers to access such as passwords and
encryption.145 This refusal to consider other factors of obscurity has seemingly

138. Id.
139. 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 197 (D. Me. 2008).
140. No. 04-08-00132, 2007 WL 1437235, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 17, 2007).
141. 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
142. Id. at 1141.
143. Id. at 1143.
144. Id. at 1147.
145. However, a few courts have looked beyond passwords. See Four Navy Seals v.
Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2005), and J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, 757 A.2d 412, 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), for a discussion on search visibility.
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resulted in the unspoken general rule that password-restricted disclosures are
private, while all other disclosures online are public.
The mentality that websites with no access barriers are “public” is
reflected in courts’ opinions. The court in Gines-Perez enunciated the
importance of protective measures in creating a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The court admitted that “it strikes the court as obvious that a claim to
privacy is unavailable to someone who places information on an indisputably,
public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any measures to protect
the information.”146 In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey was asked to determine the privacy
interest in information contained on a “closed” webpage on the social network
site MySpace.com.147 An employee at a local restaurant created a group to vent
about his employer “without any outside eyes spying in on [them].”148 The
website creator stated that “[t]his group is entirely private, and can only be
joined by invitation.”149 The court noted that the icon for the group, which was
the restaurant’s trademarked logo, “would appear only on the My[S]pace
profiles of those who were invited into the group and accepted the
invitation.”150
Because each member accessed her or his own profile by entering in a
username and password, the creator effectively restricted the website to
authorized users in possession of an invitation to the group and a passwordprotected MySpace profile. One of the invited users disclosed her password to
her managers at the restaurant, which resulted in a lawsuit by the group creator
alleging that the managers violated the group’s privacy.151 The court found that
the “[p]laintiffs created an invitation-only [I]nternet discussion space. In this
space, they had an expectation that only invited users would be able to read the
discussion.”152
By giving such weight to password protections, Pietrylo laid the
foundation for a concrete concept of obscurity. In United States v. D’Andrea,153
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts “seemed to presume
that the password protection [of a website] . . . was sufficient to afford a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”154 The court cited Professor Warren
LaFave, a “preeminent authority of the Fourth Amendment,” who “argues that
a person who avails herself of a website’s password protection should be able
146.
original).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) (emphasis in
No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *6.
497 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 2007).
Couillard, supra note 115, at 2225 (emphasis omitted).

01-HartzogStutzman (Do Not Delete)

28

2/18/2013 2:33:22 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the site’s contents.”155 LaFave
asserted that “[r]eliance on protections such [as] individual computer accounts,
password protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less
reasonable than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though
each form of protection is penetrable.”156
In Kelleher v. City of Reading, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania also noted the importance of passwords in affording a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The court concluded that “an employee
might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain e-mail
communications, depending upon the circumstances of the communication and
the configuration of the e-mail system”157—seemingly an allusion to password
protection. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces supported privacy
in emails protected by passwords in United States v. Long, stating, “[W]e find
that the password [protection] . . . support[s] the lower court’s conclusion that
Appellee met her burden of demonstrating a subjective expectation of
privacy.”158 The focus on the importance of password protection in D’Andrea,
Kelleher, and Long suggests that courts are willing to depart from the rule that
individuals have no expectation of privacy in information posted online.
Because of this willingness to protect information that is shared only with some
users, courts may be receptive to the concept of online obscurity as privacy
protection.
Several courts have considered barriers to access other than passwords in
determining whether online information deserves privacy protection. These
courts found it relevant to consider whether a computer shared its files or its
access to a network in determining if the information on a computer was
“public.”159 In United States v. Stults, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files
retrieved from that individual’s personal computer where software was used to
“make his files accessible to others for file sharing.”160 The court drew an
analogy to an off-line situation, stating, “One who gives his house keys to all of
his friends who request them should not be surprised should one of them open

155.
156.

D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.6(f) at 721 (4th ed. 2004)).
157. No. CIV. A. 01-3386, 2001 WL 1132401, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2001).
158. 64 M.J. 57, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Durdley, No. 1:09–cr–00031–MP–AK, 2010 WL 916107, at
*4–5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010) (citing United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding
that the accidental sharing of files over a computer network and thumb drive left in a common use
computer destroyed a reasonable expectation of privacy)); Interscope Records v. Duty, No.
05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (“[I]t is undisputed that the
share[d] file is publically available, therefore [the counterclaimant] cannot show that the Recording
Companies intruded upon her private affairs [by accessing the file-sharing folder on her computer].”).
160. 575 F.3d 834, 843 (2009).
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the door without knocking.”161 The court focused on the fact that the individual
had opened his computer to “anyone else with the same freely available
program” and thus “opened up his download folder to the world.”162
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon reached a similar
conclusion in United States v. Ahrndt, finding that an unsecured wireless
network and an iTunes folder configured to share access with any surrounding
computers utilizing the same software defeated a claim for a reasonable
expectation of privacy.163 Courts’ general emphasis on closed or restricted
systems shows their willingness to protect information that is shared with some
but not all. A useful definition of obscurity would be consistent with this logic
while expanding the scope of protection for Internet users.
While most courts have only looked at barriers to access to determine
whether online information is public, some courts have considered whether a
website containing the information can be located via a search engine. For
example, in Four Navy Seals, the court explicitly noted that the degree of
intrusion by a reporter was minimal because she “merely conducted a search on
the [I]nternet, and used no deception in locating and downloading the
images.”164 In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,165 the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a student maintained no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a website he created because the website was not
password-protected.166 According to the court, “any user who happened upon
the correct search terms could have stumbled upon [the] [s]tudent’s web-site.
For example, a search of the terms ‘Bethlehem Area School District’ may have
found [the] [s]tudent’s site in its results.”167 This focus on search visibility adds
a layer to the public/private analysis and cuts against the secrecy paradigm’s
central tenet that disclosed information is no longer private. Instead, search
visibility focuses on contextual factors and the reality of how individuals find
information and communicate online. Courts should further utilize this factor.
While some courts considered search visibility as something that can make
information public, search invisibility has yet to be developed as a concept that
can render information private.
Judicial recognition of practical obscurity, as well as courts’ willingness
to find privacy protection in the use of passwords and other access barriers,
suggest that courts are ready to embrace the concept of online obscurity. Until
the law provides a workable framework for obscurity in the context of online

161. Id.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *3–9 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
164. Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
165. 757 A.2d 412, 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
166. Id. (explaining that a protected website would mean that “only certain viewers could
access the site by use of a known password”).
167. Id.
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privacy, however, judges will continue to stand by the general rule that
information posted on a website accessible to anyone is “public” information.
C. The Obscurity Interest in Statutes and Regulations
Lawmakers have also implicitly recognized the value of obscurity, but
their failure to embrace it as a concept has resulted in criticism that their laws
fail to protect “privacy”—meaning secrets—or that they protect information
that is not private at all. If lawmakers instead clarified that they were seeking to
protect the obscurity of information, these laws might be perceived and
implemented differently.
Laws that implicitly value obscurity often protect information that can be
discovered or understood by those in the right situation. For example, the
Drivers Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of certain information
about any individual obtained by the DMV in a motor vehicle record.168 Of
course, much of the information protected by this statute, such as home address
and appearance, is hardly secret, or even private. But by restricting access to
this information, the law implicitly protects whatever obscurity the information
exists in. A similar logic applies to the Video Privacy Protection Act, which
prohibits videotape service providers from disclosing information such as an
individual’s rental history.169 Other videotape shoppers might be able to
observe an individual renting a particular movie in public, but that information
would be unknown to the public at large. This law therefore supports obscurity.
Financial and commercial privacy laws also restrict the disclosure of
“personal information” or “personally identifiable information,” which, while
often private, sometimes includes information that is not seen as a secret.170 A
recent dispute resulted in a determination that even a zip code qualified as

168. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2006). The Act defines “personal information” as “information
that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address, . . . telephone number, and medical or disability
information . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). It should be noted that the Video Privacy Protection Act
Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414 (2013), arguably weakened the
statute’s privacy protections by allowing video tape service providers to use advance consent obtained
over the Internet to justify the disclosure of consumers’ personally identifiable information. See, e.g.,
Chloe Albanesius, Obama Signs Bill That Lets You Share Netflix Activity on Facebook, PCMAG.COM
(Jan. 11, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2414206,00.asp; John Paul Titlow,
Thanks Congress, but We Need Privacy Laws, Not Banal Social Sharing, READWRITE (Dec. 26,
2012), http://readwrite.com/2012/05/09/sites-with-social-reading-apps-sacrifice-readers-to-facebook.
170. See, e.g., Massachusetts Breach Notification Statute, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.01
(2009) (defining “personal information” as “a Massachusetts resident’s first name and last name or
first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements that
relate to such resident: (a) Social Security number; (b) driver’s license number or state-issued
identification card number; or (c) financial account number, or credit or debit card number, with or
without any required security code, access code, personal identification number or password, that
would permit access to a resident’s financial account”); California Data Security Breach Statute, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (2004).
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protected information.171 Critics of this decision failed to see how a zip code
could be private.172 This critique suggests that the court’s use of the term
“privacy” in this case might be more confusing than clarifying. It might make
more sense to justify the decision as a protection of the obscurity of
information that, if linked to other information, could be harmful to an
individual. In this way, obscurity can protect against the misuse of personal
information.
Many of these disputes trace back to the larger debate of “privacy in
public.” A full treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article and
has been well addressed by others.173 However, if legislatures attempt to
address privacy issues involving “public” information online, we suggest that
in some instances it is not privacy generally, but obscurity specifically, that
such laws should support or protect.
In sum, courts and lawmakers have not explicitly embraced online
obscurity, although the concept is implicit in the resolution of several privacy
disputes. Obscurity has been derided as misguided174 or ineffective in actually
addressing privacy concerns,175 but these labels are often unfair and inaccurate
when applied to online information. As discussed in Part II, obscurity is a
171. See Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 619–20 (Cal. 2011); Bob
Egelko, Stores That Request ZIP Codes Violate Law, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2011, at D1.
172. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, A Ridiculous California Court Ruling: Zip Codes Are Private,
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/kashmirhill/2011/02/11/a-ridiculouscalifornia-court-ruling-zip-codes-are-private/; cf. Chris Hoofnagle, Pineda and the Law of the Jungle,
TECHNOLOGY—ACADEMICS—POLICY (TAP) (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.techpolicy.com/
PinedaLaw-of-Jungle_Hoofnagle.aspx (arguing that the Pineda decision restrains “commercial actors
that have no respect whatsoever for consumer preferences” from collecting personal information).
173. See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 85; SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 85.
174. See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower
Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
983, 1024 (2002) (“[T]he Reporters Committee ‘central purpose’ definition and theory of ‘practical
obscurity’ are judicial inventions aimed at ill-defined concerns . . . .”).
175. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records:
Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 555,
636 (2006) (stating that Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press “condemned the theory of
‘practical obscurity,’ the notion that a limited privacy interest can be maintained in public information
that is available only by sifting through files in a local courthouse and not available by more efficient
and remote, electronic searches . . . .”). Jane Kirtley has argued that in Reporters Committee:
Justice Stevens’s failure to distinguish the expectation of privacy from the expectation of
nondiscovery reflects the growing tendency of courts and legislatures to regard the
conversion of data from paper to electronic form as having some talismanic significance.
Obviously, paper documents in a file drawer are physically distinct from entries in a
computer database, and the time and effort required to retrieve them differ significantly as
well. Merely translating data from one form to another, however, should not alter their
inherently public nature.
Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amendment: Why a “Press
Exemption” Won’t Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 642 (1995); Bepko, supra note 113, at 984 (“But is a
privacy right threatened when a compilation of otherwise hard to find information—what is now
available in the courthouse—is disclosed on the Internet? . . . [I]t does not follow that access to
information alone is necessarily harmful.”).
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crucial component of online privacy. However, the utility of online obscurity is
entirely dependent upon a useful conceptualization and manageable framework.
IV.
PROPOSED DEFINITION AND FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE OBSCURITY
Recall the dictionary definition of obscurity as “Not readily noticed or
seen; inconspicuous; . . . Not clearly understood or expressed; ambiguous or
vague.”176 This understanding of obscurity provides a helpful starting point in
the attempt to define online obscurity, but it is not sufficient as a doctrinal
concept. Like the term “privacy,” obscurity is a sweeping concept with no real
doctrinal definition.177 The term “practical obscurity,” while helpful for
theoretical support, is similarly unhelpful in defining online obscurity. Practical
obscurity has roots in geographic or physical boundaries that impede the
understanding or discovery of information.178 Given the ease of aggregation
and the irrelevance of physical space online, little meaning can be extracted
from the concept underlying practical obscurity. As previously discussed,
online obscurity is concerned not with geographic or physical burdens, but
rather with different kinds of obfuscation.179
To that end, we propose the following definition: information is obscure
online if it exists in a context missing one or more key factors that are essential
to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors: (1)
search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. This
definition draws upon the previously detailed theoretical and empirical research
and requires some explication.
This proposed definition of online obscurity is based on Helen
Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity, in that the focus of the
definition is on the context in which the information exists.180 The theory of
privacy as contextual integrity proposes that privacy violations occur when the

176. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 9, at
1213 (defining “obscure”).
177. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 85, at 1–2.
178. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
179. Cf. Finn Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and
Analysis: A Political Theory of Obfuscation, 16 FIRST MONDAY (May 2, 2011),
http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3493/2955 (developing a
political philosophy of obfuscation where actors produce “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with
the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating bad data
from good.”). We think the proper metaphor for online obscurity is the key and lock. The key and lock
metaphor is well suited to online disputes given the judicial reliance on the digital version of the key:
the password. In essence, we simply propose that there is more than one key that can lock information.
Indeed, many kinds of keys and locks, each with varying strengths, exist. Considered cumulatively,
these metaphorical keys and locks fall along a spectrum that will allow courts to make a more nuanced
analysis of online information based on a scale of obscurity.
180. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 85; Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, supra note 85; Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age, supra note 85.
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disclosure of one individual’s personal information by another disrespects the
context in which the information is disclosed.181
According to Nissenbaum, the framework of contextual integrity provides
that “finely calibrated systems of social norms, or rules, govern the flow of
personal information in distinct social contexts (e.g., education, health care, and
politics).”182 Nissenbaum claims that these norms, which she refers to as
“context-relative informational norms, define and sustain essential activities
and key relationships and interests, protect people and groups against harm, and
balance the distribution of power.”183 Nissenbaum explains that context-relative
informational norms are simultaneously reflections of expectations of privacy
in certain contexts and vehicles for prescribing ways to evaluate or respond to
potential threats to privacy.184
Nissenbaum defines context as “structured social settings with
characteristics that have evolved over time . . . and are subject to a host of
causes and contingencies of purpose, place, culture, historical accident, and
more.”185 A central tenet of contextual integrity provides that “there are no
arenas of life not governed by norms of information flow . . . . Almost
everything—things that we do, events that occur, transactions that take place—
happens in a context not only of place but of politics, convention, and cultural
expectation.”186 Because Nissenbaum’s theory focuses on context, it is well
suited to frame our approach to online obscurity, which is almost entirely
context-dependent.
Our conceptualization of online obscurity also draws upon Lior
Strahilevitz’s “Social Networks Theory of Privacy,” which argues that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy where there is a low risk that
the information will spread beyond the individual’s social network.187
Strahilevitz explains how tort law typically analyzes expectations of privacy,
stating, “If it is theoretically possible, but extraordinarily unlikely, that
information shared with a few individuals will ultimately become widely
known by the public, then privacy tort law usually discounts the theoretical
possibility and holds that the data privacy subject maintains a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”188

181. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 85, at 141.
182. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 85, at 3.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 129.
185. Id. at 130.
186. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 85, at 137 (emphasis omitted).
187. Strahilevitz, supra note 85, at 920–21, 972, 988.
188. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2039 (2010)
[hereinafter Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law] (“As I explained in A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy, tort law typically analyzes expectations of privacy through a probabilistic lens.”). Therefore,
an individual who minimizes the likelihood that the public will discover her information generally
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77
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While obscurity is certainly relevant within the context of social networks,
we propose that obscurity has significant utility on the Internet outside of social
networks or self-disclosed information. In defining obscurity as the product of
an analysis of the critical four factors, we enable flexible application of the
framework across domains. Whereas technologists may wish to weigh the
factors of search visibility or unprotected access more highly in application,
policy makers may place more weight on anonymity and clarity. We
purposefully do not weigh factors; while we realize that the framework factors
will vary in importance based on setting and context, we allow individuals to
determine this balance according to the situation.
For example, while Strahilevitz’s theory would seek to limit disclosure to
certain social networks, online obscurity seeks to preserve online context
regardless of an individual’s relationship with others and regardless of whether
the information was self-disclosed or not. Additionally, the differences between
socialization and expectations of privacy off-line and online are significant
enough to require a conceptualization of obscurity contoured to the online
medium. By focusing on obfuscation techniques that hinder discovery and
comprehension, our conceptualization of online obscurity can be a manageable
analytical framework with discernible criteria for evaluating all information on
the Internet.
To reiterate, information is obscure online if it exists in a context missing
one or more key factors that are essential to discovery or comprehension. We
adopt the dictionary definition for discovery, which is “the process of learning
something that was not known before, or of finding someone or something that
was missing or hidden.”189 We define comprehension as the ability to
understand the information in a given context.
As already noted, we have identified four of these key factors: (1) search
visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. The
presence of these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it.
Thus, in determining whether information is obscure online, courts should
consider whether any of these factors were present. Information that is entirely
unobscure is completely obvious, and vice versa. Courts should engage in a
case-by-case analysis of the factors, examining each one individually, then as a
whole to determine the degree of online obscurity. Figure 1 depicts how this
conceptualization would work in two different scenarios.

U. CHI. L. REV. 1239, 1257–59 (2010) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation] (describing
the importance of using pseudonyms for one or both parties in certain disputes).
189. Discovery Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/
dictionary/british/discovery (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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FIGURE 1: Factors determining online obscurity

Scenario 1 is a blog that is visible only to invited users and is not
searchable by general search engines like Google. It is close to being
completely obscure because it is missing two of the most important factors for
finding and understanding information: search visibility and unprotected
access.190 Scenario 2 is a Twitter account that uses only a first name and a
blurry photo to identify the poster. While this information is more obvious than
the information in Scenario 1 because it is freely searchable and accessible, it is
still slightly obscure because only certain Internet users would be able to
identify the poster of the content or completely comprehend any idiosyncratic
posts. The following sections will develop the four factors of the framework
that can erode or provide online obscurity.
A. Search Visibility
The inability to locate information through search is one of the most
significant factors in online obscurity. Search is the primary method for
discovering online information, which is a key factor in our definition of
obscurity.191 Without search, individuals can discover information only in a
chain-hyperlink fashion via other websites, messages, and manual URL entries.
190. Note that this is similar to the MySpace group formed in Pietrylo v. Hillstone, No. 065754, 2008 WL 6085437 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008). See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE
USE 1 (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Search-Engine-Use/DataMemo.aspx; SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINES 1 (2002),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2002/Search-Engines/Data-Memo.aspx; LEE RAINIE,
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Yet, most online information is not visible to search engines. This
information, collectively known as “the dark Web,”192 “the deep Web,”193 or
“the invisible Web,”194 accounts for 80–99 percent of the World Wide Web.195
The dark Web does not just consist of websites that programmers have
intentionally shielded from search engines using the robot.txt file.196 It also
includes websites that use privacy settings or are behind access restrictions
such as passwords, which are another factor in online obscurity.197
Thus, anyone applying the concept of online obscurity should give
significant weight to search visibility. A finding that information can be
discovered via search renders the information more obvious and thus less likely
to be classified as private information. Information invisible to search, on the
other hand, is more obscure and accordingly more likely to receive the benefit
of privacy protections.
The breadth of the search visibility also matters. Information that is
searchable at the site level is quite different from information searchable by the
major Internet search engines (like Google or Bing) or by the deep-Web search
engines (like Pipl and iSearch). Accordingly, information that is visible to
searches of the entire Internet or can be located by a large number of search
engines is more obvious and less obscure.
In addition to the breadth of search visibility, prominence in search results
could conceivably affect the obscurity of information. The number or
complexity of terms required to effectively find information via search could
also affect the obscurity scale, although perhaps to a lesser degree.198 These and
other mitigating factors will be addressed in future research.

PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, BIG JUMP IN SEARCH ENGINE USE 1 (2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2005/Big-jump-in-search-engine-use/Data-Memo.aspx;
Gary
Marchionini, Exploratory Search: From Finding to Understanding, 49 COMM. ACM 41 (2006).
192. See Devriendt, supra note 6.
193. See Bergman, supra note 6; Kay, supra note 6.
194. See Medeiros, supra note 6; Ru & Horowitz, supra note 6.
195. See Bergman, supra note 6; Devriendt, supra note 6; Kay, supra note 6; Ru & Horowitz,
supra note 6.
196. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 127, at 102 (“Today, nearly all Web programmers know
robots.txt is the way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions are
voluntarily respected by every major search engine across differing cultures and legal jurisdictions.”).
197. For example, the popular blogging service Blogger allows users to make their blog
invisible to Google. See “Listing” and “Let Search Engines Find Your Blog” Settings, GOOGLE
BLOGGER, http://www.google.com/support/blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=41373 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012). Similarly, Facebook profiles that utilize privacy settings are also not found by search
engines. See How Do I Prevent Search Engines (e.g., Google) from Showing My Public Search
Listing?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/?page=764#!/help/?faq=12043 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012).
198. For example, finding information via search engines on a particular person with a
common name such as “John Smith” would likely require additional search terms or iterative searches.
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B. Unprotected Access
As discussed in Part III, in determining whether information is private,
courts predominantly consider whether access to information is either
unfettered or somehow restricted by technological features such as passwords
and privacy settings.199 While not dispositive, this approach is a significant part
of the obscurity calculus. Not only does restricted access help prevent the
discovery of information by unauthorized parties, it can also serve as an
indicator of the private nature of the information to those with the right
credentials.200 Thus, barriers to access can also serve to communicate a desire
or expectation of confidentiality as well as create obscurity.
Conversely, the lack of restrictions on information access, particularly
when restrictions are available but unused, has the opposite effect on obscurity.
A finding that information is accessible without restriction makes information
less obscure and more obvious. Information protected by passwords, privacy
settings, and the like is much more obscure, making it more likely to receive
the benefit of privacy protections.
Like search, the scope of the restriction matters. Some access restrictions,
like biometrics, encryption, and to a lesser degree, passwords, often offer more
than obscurity—they offer means to protect secrets. However, privacy settings
are a relatively new technology and do not yet completely reflect the users’
wishes.201 Also, as service providers change defaults and redefine fundamental
concepts of privacy within their services, privacy settings will also shift. Thus,
privacy measures should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis according to how
restrictive they are or can be.
The number of people with access to information is also important in
evaluating the breadth of the restriction. A technological restriction that allows
a small number of people to access information via passwords would make
information more obscure than a privacy setting on a social network site
granting access to “friends of friends” or everyone living in a general area. As
computing systems evolve and adoption of privacy protections increases, we
will see moves toward dynamically generated privacy zones—privacy that is
reactive to the environment and network configurations within the

199. Restrictions to access are not limited to passwords and privacy settings. Technologies
such as biometrics can also effectively restrict access to information. See, e.g., Mike Elgan, How Apple
and Google Will Kill the Password, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29, 2011, 7:55 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9206998/How_Apple_and_Google_will_kill_the_password_
?taxonomyId=15&pageNumber=2.
200. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635,
1653 (2011).
201. Michelle Madejski et al., The Failure of Online Social Network Privacy Settings (2011)
(Columbia Univ. Computer Science, unpublished Technical Report No. CUCS-010-11), available at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:135406.
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environment.202 In time, adaptive privacy, and the audiences these adapted
zones encompass, will become increasingly important.
C. Identification
Identification is both one of the central aspects of online obscurity and a
major component of general information privacy law.203 Simply put,
information that cannot be linked to a person poses a reduced threat to that
person’s privacy. While anonymity is central to many privacy disputes,204
pseudonymity often gets short shrift in legal debates. Yet the use of
identification variants (ID variants) and pseudonyms is a key component of
online obscurity. Like passwords, ID variants and pseudonyms can serve two
functions: (1) they can protect the discloser or subject of information by
unlinking content from identity, and (2) if ID variants or pseudonyms are
readily apparent, they can signal to the consumer of information that the
disclosure is sensitive or private, invoking the concept of confidentiality as well
as obscurity.
On the social web, where content is peer-produced in a social milieu, new
challenges of identity management have emerged. On social network sites,
where the articulation of the social network is a key feature, identification can
occur through both direct and indirect disclosures.205 For example, an
individual that maintains a pseudonymous profile may become publicly
identifiable based on whom the individual connects to, or what a friend writes
on the individual’s wall. Therefore, the intention of the individual in protecting
her or his identity extends beyond self-disclosure—to the management of
disclosures about the individual and to the selective crafting of the online
persona. In the context of the online obscurity framework, identification is
defined as the existence of an irrefutable piece of information that links content
online to the individual’s person.
If the identity of the discloser or subject of the content is clear, the
information is more obvious and therefore less obscure. Information associated
with an ID variant or pseudonym that is not easily traceable to a real identity,

202. See, e.g., Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer
Interaction, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 137 (2007); Maomao Wu,
Adaptive Privacy Management for Distributed Applications (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Lancaster University), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/12984/1/PhdThesisMaomaoWu.pdf.
203. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 114.
204. Id.
205. J. Donath & d. boyd, Public Displays of Connection, 22 BT TECH. J. 71 (2004) 73–77;
danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 213 (2007), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/
boyd.ellison.html (“The public display of connections is a crucial component of SNSs. The Friends list
contains links to each Friend’s profile, enabling viewers to traverse the network graph by clicking
through the Friends lists.”).

01-HartzogStutzman (Do Not Delete)

2013]

2/18/2013 2:33:22 PM

THE CASE FOR ONLINE OBSCURITY

39

on the other hand, is much more obscure, making it more likely to receive the
benefit of privacy protections.
D. Clarity
Although online information is often easily discoverable, important
aspects of that information may be incomprehensible. Information might be
intentionally vague or incomplete. Sometimes information in one domain is
separated by medium, tool, or linkage from another piece in order to make it
more obscure and thus more protected.206 Lack of clarity, meant here as the
ability to be easily understood, is a key factor of online obscurity.
As demonstrated in Part II, Internet users routinely keep information
unclear in an attempt to communicate with a smaller audience while rendering
information inert to a broader one. In her ethnographic analysis, danah boyd
noted that her teenage respondents have learned how to “hide in plain sight” by
“creating a message that can be read in one way by those who aren’t in the
know and read differently by those who are.”207 According to boyd, this
process is known as “steganography,” “an ancient technique where people hide
messages in plain sight.”208
Unlike identification, which focuses on the link between identity and
information, clarity focuses on the link between content and some other
external factor. Many kinds of information can be removed from online
disclosures to create obscurity. Consider everyday communication, which is
facilitated by shared interpersonal knowledge and linguistic styles. When
conversing, shared knowledge within groups allows individuals to
“presuppose.”209 For the purposes of the argument, we can conceptualize clarity
as the range of shared social, cultural, and linguistic factors that enable
presupposition. The eavesdropper at the restaurant may be able to understand
some of a conversation overheard, but she will likely lack the information
necessary for true comprehension or identification of the conversational
subjects. This lack of clarity renders the overheard conversation obscure. The
same is true for online communication, much of which is clouded by in-group
communication that frustrates clarity.210

206. See, e.g., Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 7.
207. danah boyd, Social Steganography: Learning to Hide in Plain Sight, ZEPHORIA (Aug. 23,
2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/08/23/social-steganography-learning-to-hidein-plain-sight.html.
208. Id. boyd gives as traditional examples “[i]nvisible ink, tattoos under hair on messengers,
and messages embedded in pictures.” Id.
209. See Goffman, supra note 23, at 1. Goffman states that “A presupposition (or assumption,
or implication, or background expectation) can be defined very broadly as a state of affairs we take for
granted in pursuing a course of action. We can perform these acts of faith without ‘doing’ anything.”
Id.
210. See, e.g., Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, Social Cues and Impression Formation in CMC,
53 J. COMM. 676 (2003); Joseph B. Walther, Selective Self-Presentation in Computer-Mediated
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A finding that information is unclear to the extent that it is unlikely to be
understood by unintended recipients renders it more obscure, making it more
likely to receive the benefit of privacy protections.
In sum, our conceptualization of online obscurity is simultaneously broad
enough to remain adaptable to new technologies while sufficiently defined to
be useful to those seeking to employ it. The next Section will explore how
online obscurity could be embraced in the privacy doctrine.
V.
POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF ONLINE OBSCURITY
This Article has demonstrated that obscurity is a central concept to online
privacy that has been glossed over by courts. We hypothesized that online
disputes have not utilized obscurity because the concept has not been well
defined or conceptualized. Now that we have offered a useful framework, we
will consider how obscurity could ameliorate tension between privacy law and
user expectations regarding online information. Generally, online obscurity can
frame the online privacy analysis and become a remedy or obligation. More
specifically, the law could take advantage of online obscurity in at least three
different ways: (1) as a continuum to determine whether information is eligible
for privacy protections; (2) as a benefit, compromise, or procedural protection;
or (3) as a duty to maintain obscurity.
We emphasize up front that remedies based on online obscurity would not
be a panacea for privacy harms. Online information that could cause significant
and irreparable harm if plucked from obscurity should be protected by other
privacy doctrines, such as confidentiality or anonymity.
However, this does not mean obscurity is a useless concept. Obscurity can
be a meaningful legal protection precisely because it is not as protective as
concepts like confidentiality or anonymity.211 Obscurity could protect
information that is less sensitive or sensitive in fewer contexts if it is ineligible
for more robust privacy protections. For example, many privacy protections,
such as the disclosure tort, do not apply to information known by a significant
number of third parties.212 However, the focus of online obscurity is not how
many people actually know of the information, but rather, the context in which
the information exists. Individuals often want to protect information that might
not be secret.213 They might not want to keep this information from being
Communication: Hyperpersonal Dimensions of Technology, Language, and Cognition, 23
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2538 (2007).
211. In their most extreme forms, confidentiality demands a complete restriction on the
dissemination of information and anonymity demands a complete inability to identify a target. See
Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 675 (2012); Gary T. Marx,
What’s in a Name? Some Reflections on the Sociology of Anonymity, 15 INFO. SOC’Y 99 (1999).
212. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, supra note 188.
213. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007).

01-HartzogStutzman (Do Not Delete)

2013]

2/18/2013 2:33:22 PM

THE CASE FOR ONLINE OBSCURITY

41

discovered or understood by everyone; they might just want to keep it away
from certain people. This is where obscurity becomes useful. Obscurity
obligations would not aim to completely curtail information disclosure; rather,
they would seek to minimize the likelihood of discovery, comprehension, or
contextualization.
The modesty of this benefit should not overshadow its significance.
Online obscurity could play a more prominent and productive role in privacy
doctrine, both as an analytical tool and as part of an obligation.
A. Continuum to Determine Eligibility for Privacy Protections
Online obscurity could replace the maligned public/private dichotomy
used to determine whether information is “public,” or ineligible for privacy
protections. As discussed in Part III, courts generally hold that the unfettered
ability of any hypothetical individual to find and access information on the
Internet renders that information public. These courts generally equate
accessibility with universal disclosure, invoking the mantra “if you want it kept
private, it probably shouldn’t be online.”214 Yet, notably, courts often give legal
significance to code-based solutions, such as passwords and encryption, that
allow users to restrict access to information online. These courts acknowledge
that technologically restricted access is important in determining whether
information is public.
These determinations have contributed to the increasingly entrenched
dichotomy where password-restricted disclosures are private, and all other
online disclosures are public. This is largely an arbitrary distinction in light of
how users actually perceive and expect privacy, as described in Part II. But
adopting the distinction is tempting because of its manageability—courts can
easily identify when Internet users employ passwords. This is particularly true
compared to the relative difficulty of trying to understand someone’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in any given context.215 Hence, any
conceptualization of online obscurity must be concrete, easy to understand,
manageable, and as objective as possible.
214. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). The
court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in social network sites, stating:
Thus, when Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact
that her personal information would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy
settings. Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose of these social networking sites else
they would cease to exist. Since Plaintiff knew that her information may become publicly
available, she cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As
recently set forth by commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, given the
millions of users, “[i]n this environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.”
Id. (citing Dana L. Fleming & Joseph M. Herlihy, What Happens When the College Rumor Mill Goes
Online? Privacy, Defamation and Online Social Networking Sites, 53 BOS. B.J. 16 (2009)).
215. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 133, at 1511–12 (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test
has led to a contentious jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence. Debates rage
over whether particular government information gathering activities invade ‘privacy.’”).
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Despite numerous cases on the issue, courts lack a generally accepted
framework or test for determining when online information is public.216 For
example, in Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, the plaintiff sought relief under the
disclosure tort against a newspaper for publishing an unflattering poem about
her hometown that was originally posted on the plaintiff’s MySpace page.217
The court denied that the poem was private because it had already been made
public by the plaintiff.218 The court found that the plaintiff had “publicized her
opinions about [her hometown] by posting the Ode on MySpace.com, a hugely
popular Internet site.”219 The court held that the plaintiff’s failure to use
protective measures such as privacy settings or password protection was
significant in determining whether she could reasonably expect online
information to be private.220
By equating “theoretically accessible” with “public,” the Moreno court
overlooked the many ways individuals obfuscate information online. Under the
court’s reasoning, the plaintiff might have had a reasonable expectation of
privacy if she protected the website with a password.221 The court failed to
consider the other factors of obscurity: whether the poem was visible to search
engines, whether the plaintiff used her real name or an ID variant, and whether
the poem was easily understood as a representation of the plaintiff’s hometown.
Instead, theoretical accessibility of the poem was the sine qua non for rendering
the information public, thus denying it protection under privacy laws.
A useful conception of online obscurity would be helpful in cases like
Moreno. Instead of an arbitrary distinction based on password use, courts
should determine where information falls on a spectrum of obscurity.
Information subjected to all four factors that obviate obscurity would be
deemed completely obvious and thus undeserving of privacy protection.
Information missing all of these elucidating factors would be deemed
completely obscure and most deserving of privacy protections. Of course, in
the middle lies the gray area, where the information has at least one, but not all,
of the indicia of online obscurity.
To that end, courts should ask the following questions based on the
framework proposed in Part IV:
1. Was the information at issue able to be found via search
engines?
2. Was access to the information restricted by password,
biometrics, privacy settings, or any other technology?

216. Strahilevitz, supra note 85, at 920–21.
217. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Ct. App. 2009).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 862.
220. Id. (“Cynthia’s affirmative act made her article available to any person with a computer
and thus opened it to the public eye.”).
221. Id.
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3. Was the information associated with an ID variant or
pseudonym that is not easily traceable to a real identity?
4. Was the information likely to be understood by unintended
recipients?
By analyzing these factors independently and as a whole, courts will
arrive at a more nuanced decision regarding whether to afford information
privacy protections.
B. Obscurity as a Protective Remedy
In addition to playing a key role in the privacy analysis, a wellconceptualized obscurity framework would serve as a protective remedy.
Specifically, obscurity would either be conferred as a benefit or provided as a
middle ground between total secrecy and complete public disclosure. This is
particularly true for information that might be embarrassing but not damaging
enough to warrant the full force of robust privacy and confidentiality
protections. In this way, obscurity could be a less effective, but also less costly,
remedy than complete confidentiality, anonymity, or the “right to be
forgotten.”222 For example, courts seeking to balance privacy and access issues
could hold that certain public records could remain online only if they receive
certain obscurity protections.
In fact, courts and lawmakers are already offering obscurity as a
procedural protection by mandating the redaction of personal identifiers such as
social security numbers from some public records.223 Several proposed privacy
protection laws focus on the collection of “personally identifiable
information.”224 Courts and lawmakers should expand the scope of these
protection laws. Pseudonymous litigation has been proposed by some as a way

222. See, e.g., Adam Thierer, Erasing Our Past on the Internet, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2011, 1:46
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2011/04/17/erasing-our-past-on-the-internet/; MAYERSCHÖNBERGER, supra note 13; Ciaran Giles, Internet ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Debate Hits Spain,
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2011/04/20/
internet_right_to_be_forgotten_debate_hits_spain/.
223. The E-Government Act of 2002 instructed that personal identifiers, such as Social
Security numbers and names of minor children, be redacted from federal court filings. Pub. L. No.
107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). See also Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From
Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 868 (2008) (“The privacy concerns
articulated in the E-Government Act led to a federal court policy and ultimately, effective December 1,
2007, new court rules directing attorneys to avoid the inclusion of certain personal identifying
information (including full Social Security numbers) in case documents.”).
224. See, e.g., Venkat Balasubramani, A Look at the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of
2011, ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & MKTG. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 9:03 AM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/04/a_look_at_the_c.htm. See also Tanya Forsheit, Breaking
Down the Boucher Bill, INFORMATIONLAWGROUP (May 12, 2010), http://www.infolawgroup.com/
2010/05/articles/behavioral-advertising/breaking-down-the-boucher-bill/.
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to ease the publicity inherent in filing a lawsuit.225 But this protection focuses
on only one aspect of obscurity—identification. As we have described, there
are other ways to protect information with online obscurity.
Online obscurity is a useful middle-ground protection. By embracing
obscurity, courts and lawmakers can avoid the complete opacity created by
traditional privacy protections, such as sealed records. At the same time, courts
and lawmakers should provide obscurity in situations where they are not
willing to provide total secrecy or confidentiality. Hence, obscurity could
protect certain privacy interests while also promoting the dissemination of
information. The FTC and other governmental agencies should consider
obfuscation as a valid technique for protecting certain kinds of consumer
information.226
Online information that is not searchable, accessible, or understandable
poses less of a threat to a user’s privacy. By making information obscure
online, the law would curtail certain abuses of “big data”227 and effectuate the
spirit of the OECD Privacy Guidelines.228 Thus, obscurity represents a
compromise between those seeking to publish or access information and those
seeking to restrict it. The proper distinction, which is beyond the scope of this
Article, is between which information requires confidentiality or secrecy and
which information is adequately protected by online obscurity.
As Part II of this Article demonstrated, Internet users desire and rely upon
the obscurity of some of their online information. Like any other desirable
result, obscurity could be a benefit for which parties negotiate in both legal
disputes and commercial transactions. For instance, if an individual sues a
website for public disclosure of private facts, the parties might voluntarily
agree on the website blocking the information from being searched instead of
completely deleting it or awarding the plaintiff a monetary settlement.229 This
225. What Does It Mean to File a Suit Pseudonymously?, WITHOUT MY CONSENT,
http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/quick_link/what-does-it-mean-file-suit-pseudonymously
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2012). See Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, supra note 188.
226. Commercial data brokers also collect obscure but available information online and should
be regulated under this approach. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A
Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357.
227. JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, BIG
DATA: EXPERTS SAY NEW FORMS OF INFORMATION WILL HELP PEOPLE BE MORE NIMBLE AND
ADAPTIVE, BUT WORRY OVER HUMANS’ CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND AND USE THESE NEW TOOLS
WELL (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Future_of_
Internet_2012_Big_Data.pdf.
228. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and the Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (setting forth data privacy guidelines for industry and governments that
enable the transborder transfer of information).
229. Plaintiffs in privacy disputes have an increasingly difficult time collecting monetary
damages. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and the Privacy Torts,
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compromise lowers the likelihood that other parties, such as employers, find
the information while allowing the website to keep the information posted.
Again, online obscurity as a protective measure is hardly suitable for
information likely to be shared and widely linked to throughout the Internet.
Some information, particularly concerning celebrities and public officials, must
be kept secret or highly confidential to avoid wide distribution on the Web.
Additionally, it is very difficult to predict what information will go viral online.
Information can be irrelevant to most people while potentially harmful to
some—for example, photos of a high school student with alcohol may be
viewed by admissions counselors. Most people have no interest in viewing or
incentive to look for these pictures, so obscurity would benefit those users who
might be harmed by such information.
A similar argument is made for the average job applicant. Many
professionals assert that your “online resume”—what employers can quickly
find about you online—is just as, if not more, important than your actual
resume.230 However, only obvious, nonobscure information is likely to be
found or read by employers. According to Michael Fertik and David
Thompson, only information that can be found by an average user in five
minutes or less is part of your online resume.231 Thus, if a job applicant is
concerned about how an embarrassing or personal photo might affect her job
prospects, it is possible—by burying the photo in obscurity—to minimize the
likelihood a potential employer would find it in a routine background search.
Obscurity’s usefulness as a benefit or protection is illustrated by the fact
that a number of groups have already entered the obscurity business.
Reputation.com, for example, is a company that helps customers protect their
reputations through various techniques, including suppressing search results to
make harmful information more obscure.232
A full exploration of online obscurity as a protective remedy is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, this Section shows how online obscurity might
serve as a legal benefit or halfway point between two extremes of no protection
and total secrecy.
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2010, 4:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/theslow-demise-of-defama_b_758570.html.
230. See, e.g., MICHAEL FERTIK & DAVID THOMPSON, WILD WEST 2.0: HOW TO PROTECT
AND RESTORE YOUR ONLINE REPUTATION ON THE UNTAMED SOCIAL FRONTIER 26 (2010) (“[F]or
example, information about you that can be found only through a detailed query in a very specific
government database might make up some part of your online reputation, but it is not part of your
online résumé.”).
231. Id. at 26.
232. See REPUTATION.COM, http://www.reputation.com/reputationdefender (last visited Nov.
10, 2012). One physician hired Online Reputation Manager, “a company that helps clients push down
unfavorable content in search engine results. The effort has crowded out coverage of [a research]
scandal and retraction notices on medical journals’ websites.” Taylor Doherty, Potti Hires Online
Reputation Manager, CHRONICLE (Apr. 14, 2011) http://dukechronicle.com/article/potti-hires-onlinereputation-manager.
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C. Share Alike: An Agreement to Maintain Obscurity
The current discussion surrounding online agreements and privacy centers
on confidentiality agreements and consent to obtain and use personal
information.233 Explicit confidentiality agreements can be awkward to obtain in
the course of social interaction.234 By agreeing to keep information
confidential, users are largely prohibited from disclosing the information at all.
Online obscurity is an alternative to the standard confidentiality
agreement. Instead of binding adherents to a duty of confidentiality, disclosers
of information could impose a duty on potential recipients of information to
maintain the obscurity of that information. For example, social network site
users could promise to keep information invisible from search engines, to
protect further disclosures of information with privacy settings, or to ensure
disclosers’ names remain unassociated with the disclosed information.
This approach highlights online obscurity’s reliance on Nissenbaum’s
theory. Website user agreements would require recipients of information to
keep the information as obscure as they found it. In other words, recipients
would be bound to respect the information’s contextual integrity. By
identifying beforehand specific factors critical to online obscurity, adherents
would have a clearer picture of the practices that would breach their agreement.
Agreements to maintain online obscurity could resemble the “share alike”
principle embedded in Creative Commons and open software licenses. Creative
Commons is an organization that offers a variety of copyright licenses that
allow creators to choose how their work can be utilized and the terms on which
it can be shared.235 Under a “share alike” provision, a copyright owner licenses
a user to do things like remix, tweak, and build upon the work in a
noncommercial way, as long as the user licenses his or her new creation under
the identical terms stipulated by the original copyright owner.236 Following the
“share alike” principle, adherents to obscurity agreements would simply keep
the information as generally obscure as they found it.
Promises to maintain obscurity might be most relevant when new
technology is introduced in established contexts. Consider facial-recognition
233. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of
Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545 (2006); Allyson W. Haynes,
Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 587 (2007); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529 (2007).
234. See, e.g., Sandra Braman & Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as
Media Law, 5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 422 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV.
459, 460 (2006); Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006); Nancy S. Kim, ‘Wrap
Contracts and Privacy 1 (Mar. 29, 2010) (Ass’n for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Press,
unpublished Technical Report No. SS-10-05), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580111.
235. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012).
236. Id.
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technology and social media: social network sites or sharing sites like
Facebook often promise to respect both the user’s privacy and her or his
privacy settings.237 An important function of some of these websites is the
ability to tag photos.238 Once a photo is tagged with an identifier, such as a
name or link to a profile, it becomes searchable. According to our
conceptualization, making information visible to search significantly erodes the
protection of obscurity, and, consequently, threatens a user’s privacy. Thus, if a
website promised to respect a user’s privacy and privacy settings, a destruction
of online obscurity would constitute a breach of that promise.
Agreements between Internet users could also incorporate online
obscurity by including a duty to refrain from making information more
obvious. Instead of binding users to an agreement of confidentiality, Internet
users interacting with each other, for example in online communities, could
also promise to keep the information as obscure as they found it. This advances
Lior Strahilivetz’s social networks theory of privacy.239 Obscurity could be an
effective way to implement that theory by lowering the risk of others accessing
or understanding information, which could bolster the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy. Social networks are difficult to define, but it is easier
for users to respect specific obfuscation techniques, such as refraining from
reposting information on web pages indexed by search engines, than attempt to
guess the limits of these “blurry-edged networks.”240
As with the previous potential applications of online obscurity, a full
explication of a duty to maintain obscurity is beyond the scope of this Article
and will be addressed in future research. However, this Section illuminates how
agreements regarding personal information can encompass more than just
duties of confidentiality. A duty to maintain obscurity is a desirable and
manageable provision for parties entering into personal information agreements
regarding personal information.
CONCLUSION
In Aldous Huxley’s novel Those Barren Leaves, one of the main
characters, Mrs. Thriplow, conversed with a houseguest on the difficulty of
being genuine in the face of significant public exposure.241 She stated, “I get
quite frightened when I see my name in the papers and photographers want to
take pictures of me and people ask me out to dinner. I’m afraid of losing my

237. See Hartzog, supra note 200, at 1636–38.
238. See, e.g., Posting, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/docs/en/posting (last visited Nov. 10,
2012); Tagging Photos, PICASA, http://support.google.com/picasa/answer/106209/?& (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012); What Is Tagging and How Does It Work?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/?faq=13407 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (discussing how to tag posts).
239. Strahilevitz, supra note 85, at 920–21.
240. See Gelman, supra note 1, at 1317–19.
241. ALDOUS HUXLEY, THOSE BARREN LEAVES 19 (1925).
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obscurity. Genuineness only thrives in the dark. Like celery.”242 Mrs.
Thriplow’s fears echo the concerns of those who disclose information online.
Perhaps more than anything else, Internet users rely on obscurity for protection
of their online information. Obscurity allows Internet users to be genuine by
disclosing information that they would not otherwise share in “public.” Yet this
concept, which is at the very heart of the social web, is largely undeveloped in
privacy law.
In this Article, we have made the case for obscurity online. While
obscurity is an everyday phenomenon, we bring our practices of obscurity
online as well. As our online and off-line networks interact, and online
environments move away from anonymity to “nonymity,” we have created and
evolved a rich set of strategies to protect our disclosures online. Collectively,
we describe these strategies as producing obscurity, a flexible strategy for the
management of disclosure in increasingly heterogeneous, nonymous
environments.
We have argued that the law has failed to embrace online obscurity
because the concept lacks a coherent meaning. To that end, we have offered the
first conceptualization of online obscurity as a doctrinal model. Information is
obscure online if it exists in a context missing one or more key factors that are
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these
factors: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4)
clarity. The presence of these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence
enhances it. Thus, in determining whether information is obscure online, courts
should consider whether any of these factors were present. Information that is
entirely unobscure is completely obvious, and vice versa. Courts should engage
in a case-by-case analysis of the factors to determine the degree of online
obscurity.
This Article also proposed ways to implement obscurity as a remedy to
ease the tension between privacy law and the expectations of Internet users.
This framework could be applied in online privacy disputes as an analytical
tool or as part of an obligation. Obscurity could serve as a continuum when
courts are asked to determine if information is eligible for privacy protections.
Obscurity could be used as a benefit or protection—instead of forcing websites
to remove information, a compromise could be some form of mandated
obscurity. Finally, obscurity could serve as a metric for the boundary of
allowable disclosure by information recipients. Internet users who were bound
to a “duty to maintain obscurity” would be allowed to further disclose
information, so long as they kept the information as generally obscure as they
received it.
This conceptualization and proposed implementation of online obscurity
are meant to be an introduction, not the final word. Additional research and
242.

Id.
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analysis are required to fully explore how the law might utilize online
obscurity. As researchers have pointed out, the emergence of the nonymous
social web introduces challenges to traditional models of studying online
identity and disclosure. We must update our understanding of informationsharing in these environments with both observational and inferential analysis.
In doing so, we will better understand how individuals shift their expectations
of obscurity off-line to these increasingly populated and important online
environments.
Courts and lawmakers can no longer allow online obscurity to languish in
privacy doctrine. The concept is too central to the expectations of Internet
users. Instead, online obscurity should be embraced as a useful concept capable
of alleviating the problems associated with flawed approaches like the
public/private dichotomy. Online obscurity could be another useful tool to
address the array of privacy problems in the digital age, but only if it is pulled
from the shadows.
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